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ABSTRACT
Of all the controversial presidential actions during President
Trump’s first three years in office, few challenged the norms of
presidential behavior more than his constant barrage of attacks on his
own Department of Justice. President Trump violated traditional norms
governing the relationship between the White House and the Department
of Justice in two distinct ways. First, on Twitter and in other public
statements, he repeatedly called upon the Department to investigate
political opponents. Second, the President repeatedly attacked the
Department’s investigation of Russian interference with the 2016
presidential election (“the Mueller investigation”) and other
investigations relating to the misconduct of the President and his
associates. White House interference in cases where the President has a
personal or political stake raises obvious conflict-of-interest problems
that threaten the impartiality of the criminal justice system. Not since
Richard Nixon has a president been so heedless of these potential
conflicts of interest. President Trump’s efforts to influence individual
investigations raised serious concerns within and outside of the
Department of Justice.
Thus far, the academic treatments of President Trump’s DOJ
interactions have focused solely on the rules that have traditionally
governed the relationship between the White House and the Department
of Justice. These articles have made persuasive cases that President
Trump’s actions violate these informal norms and constitutionally based
policies. Although the President properly must be concerned with the
general policies that govern the allocation of prosecutorial resources and
the focus of government law enforcement at the Department of Justice, it
is a different matter when the White House becomes involved with
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individual investigations and prosecutions. White House influence over
individual cases creates at least the appearance of improper political
influence designed to punish opponents and shield the friends of the
incumbent President.
The case against White House involvement in individual cases
becomes much stronger, however, when placed in the context of
constitutional limitations on the involvement of both the judicial and
legislative branches in individual prosecutorial decision making. These
rules prevent federal judges and the Congress from ordering federal
prosecutors to initiate criminal cases or investigations. Moreover, the
rules are sufficiently strict to prevent the other branches from influencing
prosecutorial decisions through indirect methods such as congressional
oversight of open criminal investigations.
The constitutional rules governing federal prosecutorial
independence derive from the fundamental constitutional principle that
all three branches must act independently before the federal government
may punish someone for violating federal criminal law. Congress must
act by passing a criminal statute of general applicability; the executive
branch must independently investigate potential violations of that law
and select individuals for prosecution; and the federal courts must
determine individual guilt in a trial where the right to a jury is
guaranteed. Thus, judicial and legislative involvement in individual
prosecutorial decisions is constitutionally forbidden not because the
involvement infringes on the President’s authority, but rather because
such involvement would impermissibly aggrandize the other branches
by giving them power over more than one stage of the three-stage federal
criminal justice process.
These constitutional restrictions on judicial and legislative
involvement in prosecutorial decisions strongly reinforce the case for
prosecutorial independence from White House involvement in
individual cases and investigations. The integrity of the process depends
upon prosecutorial decisions that are free from political influence and
based solely on the merits of the individual case. Each branch must play
its part independently of the others, and the role of the executive branch
is compromised if political influence taints the process of independent
prosecutorial decision-making.
How then might we might respond to these challenges to federal
prosecutorial independence? The first response is conceptual. We can
reinforce the norm of prosecutorial independence within the executive
branch by placing it in the context of the separation-of-powers principles
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that mandate prosecutorial independence from the judicial and
legislative branches. These principles explain why the norm of
prosecutorial independence from the White House in individual cases is
so important. Second, Congress has several informal mechanisms to
strengthen and preserve this norm, including oversight hearings and the
Senatorial confirmation process. Third, we should consider potential
statutory or regulatory changes that would protect prosecutorial
independence in individual cases while respecting the President’s
constitutional power to direct the general policies and management of
the Department of Justice.
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INTRODUCTION
Of all the controversial presidential actions during President
Trump’s first three years in office, few challenged the norms of
presidential behavior more than his constant barrage of attacks on his
own Department of Justice.1 President Trump violated traditional
norms governing the relationship between the White House and the
Department of Justice in two distinct ways. First, on Twitter and in other
public statements, he repeatedly called upon the Department to
investigate political opponents.2 Second, the President repeatedly
attacked the Department’s investigation of Russian interference with
the 2016 presidential election (“the Mueller investigation”) and other
1. For a thorough discussion of the significance of President Trump’s actions towards the
Department of Justice, see generally Bruce Green and Rebecca Roiphe, Can the President
Control the Department of Justice?, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2018); Andrew Kent, Congress and the
Independence of Federal Law Enforcement, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1927 (2018); Daphna Renan,
Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187 (2018); Andrew McCanse Wright, The
Take Care Clause, Justice Department Independence, and White House Control, 121 W. VA. L.
REV. 355 (2018); Mark Mazzetti et al., Intimidation, Pressure and Humiliation: Inside Trump’s
Two-Year War on the Investigations Encircling Him, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/19/us/politics/trump-investigations.html; No “Absolute Right”
to Control DOJ: Constitutional Limits on White House Interference with Law Enforcement
Matters, PROTECT DEMOCRACY (2018), https://protectdemocracy.org/resource-library/document
/no-absolute-right-control-doj/.
2. See Mazzetti, supra note 1 (describing how the President encouraged House Republicans
to conduct oversight hearings regarding Hillary Clinton and members of the FBI); see also infra
text accompanying notes 273–283.
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investigations relating to the misconduct of the President and his
associates.3 White House interference in cases where the President has
a personal or political stake raises obvious conflict-of-interest problems
that threaten the impartiality of the criminal justice system. Not since
Richard Nixon has a president been so heedless of these potential
conflicts of interest.4 President Trump’s efforts to influence individual
investigations raised serious concerns within and outside of the
Department of Justice.5
Concern over these issues intensified after the release of the
Mueller Report (“the Report”).6 In particular, Volume II of the Report
recounts 10 instances of obstruction of justice by President Trump, each
of which, at the very least, constitutes an unprecedented interference
with the work of the Department of Justice in ongoing investigations.7
Whether the Report establishes a case for criminal obstruction of
justice is the subject of an ongoing intense debate.8 Even if the
President’s actions do not amount to conduct that could be prosecuted
as obstruction of justice, they raise grave concerns about politically
motivated White House influence over open criminal investigations.
Thus far, the academic treatment of President Trump’s DOJ
interactions has focused solely on the rules that have traditionally
governed the relationship between the White House and the

3. See Mazzetti, supra note 1 (detailing how the President used Twitter to call the Mueller
investigation a “witch hunt” and undermine potential witnesses to the investigation).
4. See Green and Roiphe, supra note 1, at 3 (referencing President Nixon’s “Saturday Night
Massacre” in his attempt to stop the Special Counsel investigation).
5. See Mazzetti, supra note 1.
6. United States Department of Justice, Report on the Investigation into Russian
Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election, Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III (2019)
[hereinafter Mueller Report]. The version released by the Department of Justice in May of 2019
was redacted to protect grand jury material and information that could reveal investigative
sources and methods or cause harm to ongoing investigations.
7. See id. at Volume II, 15–158 (describing potential instances of obstruction of justice).
8. See Read: Attorney General Barr’s Letter on the Mueller Report’s Principal Conclusions,
WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2019, 8:01 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/context/read-attorneygeneral-barr-s-principal-conclusions-of-the-mueller-report/218b8095-c5e3-4eab-9135-4170f5b3e
87f/ (Attorney General Barr summarizing the findings of the Mueller Report and said: “I have
concluded that the evidence developed during the Special Counsel’s investigation is not sufficient
to establish that the President committed an obstruction-of-justice offense.”); see contra Rachael
Bade, et al., Democrats Close in on Citing Barr for Contempt, WASH. POST (May 7, 2019,
2:59AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-would-have-beencharged-with-obstruction-were-he-not-president-hundreds-of-former-federal-prosecutors-assert
/2019/05/06/e4 946a1a-7006-11e9-9f06-5fc2ee80027a_story.html (“More than 450 former federal
prosecutors who worked in Republican and Democratic administrations have signed on to a
statement asserting special counsel Robert S. Mueller III’s findings would have produced
obstruction charges against President Trump—if not for the office he holds.”).
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Department of Justice.9 These articles have made persuasive cases that
President Trump’s actions violate these informal norms and
constitutionally based policies.
Although President Trump properly must be concerned with the
general policies that govern the allocation of prosecutorial resources
and the focus of government law enforcement at the Department of
Justice, it is a different matter when the White House becomes involved
with individual investigations and prosecutions. At the very least, White
House influence over individual cases creates the appearance of
improper political influence designed to punish opponents and shield
the friends of the incumbent President. The problem of White House
involvement in open cases becomes much stronger, however, when
placed in the context of constitutional limitations on the involvement
of both the judicial and legislative branches in individual prosecutorial
decision making. These rules prevent federal judges and Congress from
ordering federal prosecutors to initiate criminal cases or investigations.
Moreover, the rules are sufficiently strict to prevent the other branches
from influencing prosecutorial decisions through indirect methods,
such as congressional oversight of open criminal investigations.10
The constitutional rules governing federal prosecutorial
independence derive from the fundamental constitutional principle
that all three branches must act independently before the United States
government may punish someone for violating federal criminal law.
Congress must act by passing a criminal statute of general applicability;
the executive branch must independently investigate potential
violations of that law and select individuals for prosecution; and the
federal courts must determine individual guilt in a trial where the right
to a jury is guaranteed. Thus, judicial and legislative involvement in
individual prosecutorial decisions is constitutionally forbidden not only
because the involvement infringes on the President’s authority, but also
because such involvement would impermissibly aggrandize the other
branches by giving them power over more than one stage of the threestage federal criminal justice process.
These constitutional restrictions on judicial and legislative
involvement in prosecutorial decisions strongly reinforce the case for
prosecutorial independence from White House involvement in

9. See, e.g., Kent, supra note 1; Wright, supra note 1.
10. Todd David Peterson, Congressional Oversight of Open Criminal Investigations, 77
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1373, 1437–38 (2002) [hereinafter Peterson, Congressional Oversight].
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individual cases and investigations. This does not mean that the
Constitution prohibits such White House interference; rather, it means
that politically motivated White House involvement in individual
prosecutions is a serious abuse of presidential power.
This article analyzes these issues in four parts. Part I describes the
role of each branch in the criminal justice process. Part II examines the
independence of federal prosecutors from the judicial branch. Part III
assesses the parallel constitutional restrictions on the legislative
branch, which prevent Congress from ordering the initiation or closure
of criminal investigations or cases.11 Part IV shifts to the executive
branch to analyze the traditional constraints on White House
involvement in individual cases.12 Part V discusses some normative
conclusions about federal prosecutorial independence.13
This final section considers responses to the challenges to federal
prosecutorial independence.14 The first response is conceptual. We can
reinforce the norm of prosecutorial independence within the executive
branch by placing it in the context of the separation-of-powers
principles that mandate prosecutorial independence from the judicial
and legislative branches. These principles explain why prosecutorial
independence from the White House in individual cases is so
important. Second, Congress has several informal mechanisms that
strengthen and preserve this norm, including oversight hearings and the
Senate confirmation process. Third, we should consider potential
statutory or regulatory changes that would protect prosecutorial
independence in individual cases while respecting the President’s
constitutional power to direct the general policies and management of
the Department of Justice.
I. THE ROLE OF EACH OF THE BRANCHES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
PROCESS
All three branches play an important and distinct role before a
person is incarcerated for a crime.15 The legislature must pass a law of
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. See infra Part V.
14. See id.
15. See In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev’d on other grounds,
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (“The constitutional scheme is as simple as it is complete–
Congress passes the criminal law in the first instance, the President enforces the law, and
individual cases are tried before a neutral judiciary involved in neither the creation nor the
execution of that law.”). In Morrison, the Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit’s decision
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general applicability that defines certain types of activities as criminal.
The executive must designate a particular individual as deserving of
prosecution under applicable standards of prosecutorial discretion.
Finally, the judiciary must pass upon the guilt or innocence of that
specific individual. The separation of these functions into three
separate branches helps to ensure that no person is subjected to the
ultimate coercive power of the state on the basis of the actions of only
one or two branches of the federal government. This distribution and
separation of the powers serves as an important protection against
arbitrary punishment.16 Each branch has the exclusive authority over
its constitutionally given power that precludes the other two branches
from exercising those same powers.
When it comes to the executive branch in particular, its power is
limited to making the decision of whether to prosecute.17 As John
Marshall stated when he was a member of Congress, the executive
branch may “direct that the criminal be prosecuted no further. This is . . .
the exercise of an indubitable and a constitutional power.”18 The Office
of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) summed up the principle thusly: “The
Executive’s exclusive authority to prosecute violations of the law gives
rise to the corollary that neither the Judicial nor Legislative Branches
may directly interfere with the prosecutorial discretion of the
Executive by directing the Executive Branch to prosecute particular
individuals.”19 In reviewing the basis for this principle, this article pays
attention to the reasons behind the limitations on judicial and
legislative power to inform the reader’s understanding of federal
prosecutorial independence within the executive branch.

holding that the Independent Counsel Provisions of the Ethics in Government Act were
unconstitutional, see Morrison, 487 U.S. at 659–60, 697, but did not disapprove the above-cited
principle.
16. See In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d at 488 (“The Constitution therefore carefully distributes
the various responsibilities for criminal prosecution among each of the three branches, so that
citizens may not be endangered by one branch acting alone.”).
17. In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255, 263 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
18. Congressman John Marshall, Speech to the House of Representatives (1800), reprinted
in 18 U.S. app. at 29 (1820) (cited in Aiken County, 725 F.3d at 263).
19. Prosecution for Contempt of Congress of an Executive Branch Official Who Has Asserted
a Claim of Executive Privilege, 8 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 101, 115 (1984), 1984 WL 178358
[hereinafter Olson Memorandum].
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II. FEDERAL PROSECUTORIAL INDEPENDENCE FROM THE JUDICIAL
BRANCH
The judicial branch has a limited and specific role to play in the
criminal justice process. The courts may act to determine individual
guilt or innocence only after Congress declares that certain conduct is
subject to criminal sanctions and the executive branch independently
determines who should be prosecuted for criminal violations. The
different doctrines that reflect this constitutional principle are
discussed below.
A. The Prohibition Against Judicially Created Crimes
During the first two decades after the ratification of the
Constitution, there was considerable controversy over whether federal
courts had inherited the traditional English common law power to
recognize and punish crimes as a matter of common law without
statutory warrant.20 Prior to 1812, at least eight federal circuit court
cases had recognized federal common law crimes.21 Moreover, the issue
split the dominant parties of the 1790s, with the Federalists generally
supporting the legitimacy of federal common law crimes and the
Jeffersonians opposing it.22 By the time the issue reached the Court,
however, this debate had been decisively resolved against the
constitutionality of federal common law crimes.23
United States v. Hudson and Goodwin24 delivered the death blow.
The case involved an indictment for criminal libel about the President
and Congress published in a Connecticut newspaper.25 Although there
was no statute making libel a criminal offense, it was recognized as a
crime at common law. If the federal courts possessed all the commonlaw powers of their English forbears, it would have been well within the
Court’s authority to punish the alleged offense. Instead, the Court
unanimously recognized the incompatibility of English common-law
power with the constitutionally mandated separation of powers in the
context of criminal prosecutions.26 The Court held:
20. Gary D. Rowe, Note, The Sound of Silence: United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, The
Jeffersonian Ascendency, and the Abolition of Federal Common Law Crimes, 101 YALE L.J. 919,
924 (1992).
21. See id. at 920 n.8 (citing relevant cases).
22. Id. at 922.
23. Id. at 922–23.
24. 11 U.S. 32 (1812).
25. Rowe, supra note 20, at 924.
26. Id. at 922 (“[The abolition of common law crimes] crystallized the realization . . . that the
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If it may communicate certain implied powers to the general
Government, it would not follow that the Courts of that
Government are vested with jurisdiction over any particular act
done by an individual in supposed violation of the peace and dignity
of the sovereign power. The legislative authority of the Union must
first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the
Court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence.27

This decision established a firm principle that separated the roles of
Congress and the courts with respect to criminal prosecutions. The
courts adjudicate individual guilt or innocence once a case has been
brought before them, but they play no role in determining the generally
applicable rules governing what types of conduct may be subject to
criminal prosecution, as Congress has the exclusive authority to make
such rules through the legislative process.
B. The Prohibition Against Judicially Mandated Prosecutions
The constitutional prohibition against judicial involvement in the
creation of federal crimes extends equally to the selection of
individuals for prosecution. The principle that courts will not step in to
order the prosecution of a particular individual is not merely a
common-law doctrine; it is rooted in the constitutional separation of
powers. For example, in United States v. Nixon28 the Court announced
in sweeping dictum that “the executive branch has exclusive authority
and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case.”29 The
Court has acknowledged this principle on many other occasions.30
Moreover, the Court has recognized the authority of the Attorney
General to be the exclusive representative of the United States in
litigation.31
Constitution and the common law could not coexist, that the American system of government
had broken off from its English antecedents more sharply than anyone had quite realized.”).
27. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. at 34. However, the Court recognized that a court has the
inherent power to impose sanctions for contempt of court. This power is discussed at greater
length. See infra text accompanying notes 54–61.
28. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
29. Id. at 693.
30. For example, in Heckler v. Chaney, the Court stated, in relation to sanctioning the FDA’s
discretion to not commence an enforcement action against a drug manufacturer in evaluating the
use of lethal injection as a method of capital punishment, that “[a]n agency’s refusal to institute
proceedings shares to some extent the characteristics of the decision of a prosecutor in the
Executive Branch not to indict—a decision which has long been regarded as the special province
of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive who is charged by the Constitution to
‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’” 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (citing U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 3)
31. See United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273, 282–85 (1888); The Confiscation
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The lower courts have expressly recognized this constitutional
limitation on their power as well. For example, in Pugach v. Klein,32 a
district court refused to order a United States Attorney to prosecute an
individual for a violation of federal wiretap laws.33 The court asserted
that it was without the power to make such an order because it was
clear beyond question that it is not the business of the Courts to tell
the United States Attorney to perform what they conceive to be his
duties. Article II, § 3 of the Constitution provides that “[the
President] shall take Care that the Laws [shall] be faithfully
executed.” The prerogative of enforcing the criminal law was vested
by the Constitution, therefore, not in the Courts, nor in private
citizens, but squarely in the executive arm of the government.34

This constitutional division of authority rests on two principles: a
non-interference principle, which prevents the judicial and legislative
branches from second-guessing decisions that can be made more
effectively by the executive branch; and a non-aggrandizement
principle, which prevents other branches from abusing their authority
by adding prosecutorial power to the other powers they exercise.35
The non-interference principle is founded on the idea that federal
prosecutors are empowered to consider a wide range of factors in
determining whom to prosecute. The Supreme Court discussed these
multiple factors in Wayte v. United States,36 a case dealing with the issue
of selective prosecution:
This broad discretion rests largely on the recognition that the
decision to prosecute is particularly ill suited to judicial review. Such
factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general
deterrence value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the
case’s relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan
are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are
competent to undertake. Judicial supervision in this area, moreover,
entails systemic costs of particular concern. Examining the basis of
a prosecution delays the criminal proceeding, threatens to chill law
enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor’s motives and decisionmaking to outside inquiry, and may undermine prosecutorial
Cases, 74 U.S. 454, 457 (1869); The Gray Jacket, 72 U.S. 370, 371 (1866).
32. 193 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
33. Id. at 635
34. Id. at 634.
35. Todd David Peterson, Procedural Checks: How the Constitution (And Congress) Control
the Power of the Three Branches, 13 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 211, 221 (2017) [hereinafter
Peterson, Procedural Checks].
36. 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
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effectiveness by revealing the Government’s enforcement policy.
All these are substantial concerns that make the courts properly
hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute.37

Thus, because the executive branch is uniquely competent to take
account of these many permissible factors, the other branches are
prohibited from interfering with decisions not to prosecute.
Prosecutorial discretion at the federal level, however, is about more
than just respect for the authority of the executive branch; it is an
integral part of the separation of powers created by the Constitution to
protect citizens’ rights by limiting the power of the branches to abuse
their authority. Thus, the focus is not just on the extent to which
executive branch power may be limited or circumscribed, but rather on
the extent to which the authority of the judiciary may be enlarged to
include a power that may be reserved solely to the executive branch.
This distinction is more than a semantic one. It reflects a genuine
difference with respect to the policies of the constitutionally mandated
separation of powers: the need to avoid a concentration of powers that
can lead to the deprivation of individual rights.
This constitutional principle was the foundation for the Fifth
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Cox,38 the leading circuit court case
on the scope of federal prosecutorial discretion. In Cox, the court
overturned a district court order that required a United States
Attorney to prepare and sign an indictment returned by a grand jury.
The court noted that “[t]he Attorney General is the hand of the
President in taking care that the laws of the United States in legal
proceedings and in the prosecution of offenses be faithfully executed”
and “as an incident of the constitutional powers, . . . the courts are not
to interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of the
attorneys of the United States in their control over criminal
prosecutions.”39
Even the three dissenting judges in Cox conceded that although
they believed that the United States Attorney could be required to sign
the indictment, “once the indictment is returned, the Attorney General

37. Id. at 607–08; accord Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987); see James
Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1540–42 (1981)
(discussing how the Supreme Court has largely upheld the exercise of prosecutorial discretion
except in the rare cases where prosecutions are initiated based on race, sex, religion, or the
exercise of free speech rights or motivated by personal animus or retaliation).
38. 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965) (en banc), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965).
39. Id. at 171.
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or the United States Attorney can refuse to go forward.”40 Cox clearly
links the discretion not to prosecute a particular individual with the
constitutional principle of separation of powers.41
Many other lower courts have cited Cox with approval and
followed the Fifth Circuit’s lead.42 For example, the Second Circuit
stated:
The relevance of Cox to our opinion is not in its teaching that
indictments require consent of the government attorney. More
pertinent is Cox’s telling statement about the nature of the checks
and balances inherent in our legal system. Not only must the
prosecutor wait for the grand jury’s determination before he or she
may proceed in a felony case, but the grand jury may not issue an
indictment where the prosecutor is opposed. Moreover, the court
lacks the power to compel the prosecutor to proceed over his
objection. Viewed in this light, the federal grand jury system reflects
the structure of our constitutional scheme, requiring, for proper
resolution, diffusion of power and the existence of checks and
balances.43

By emphasizing the “diffusion of power” and the existence of “checks
and balances,” the Court made clear that prosecutorial discretion is not
just a matter of protecting executive power, but also about protecting
individual rights by ensuring that each branch is an independent

40. Id. at 179 (Rives, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
41. Cox did not, however, shield the entire prosecutorial process from judicial supervision.
A majority of the court (composed of the three dissenting judges and one concurring judge) took
the view that the United States Attorney could be required to prepare an indictment for use by
the grand jury. See id. at 177–81 (Rives, Gewin, & Bell, JJ. concurring in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 182–85 (Brown, J., concurring). In addition, the district court in In re Grand Jury, 315
F. Supp. 662 (D. Md. 1970), held that although a United States Attorney could not be required to
sign an indictment and forced to proceed with a prosecution, in a case in which the grand jury
wished to indict, “the substance of the charges in the indictment should be disclosed, omitting
certain portions as to which the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, concludes that the public
interest in disclosure is outweighed by the private prejudice to the persons involved, none of
whom are charged with any crime in the proposed indictment.” Id. at 678–79. Thus, at least under
this view, the United States Attorney might be required to prepare and publish an indictment
under certain circumstances, although the court could not require him to proceed with a
prosecution.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1200 (9th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Easton, 937 F.2d 160, 162 (5th Cir. 1991); Fields v. Soloff, 920 F.2d 1114, 1117–18 (2nd
Cir. 1990); United States v. Hammer, Criminal Action No. 4:96–CR–0239, 2014 WL 2465276, at
*17 (M.D. Pa. May 29, 2014); United States v. Slone, 969 F. Supp. 2d 830, 837 (E.D. Ky. 2013); In
re Mayer, No. 05–33 (SRC), 2006 WL 20526, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 4, 2006); United States v. Chi
Keung Chim, 708 F. Supp. 38, 44 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
43. Soloff, 920 F.2d at 1118.
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decision-maker within its assigned area of the criminal prosecution
process.
Then-Circuit Judge Brett Kavanaugh stated the reasons for
requiring independent prosecutorial decision-making even more
clearly:
The Executive’s broad prosecutorial discretion and pardon powers
illustrate a key point of the Constitution’s separation of powers. One
of the greatest unilateral powers a President possesses under the
Constitution, at least in the domestic sphere, is the power to protect
individual liberty by essentially under-enforcing federal statutes
regulating private behavior—more precisely, the power either not
to seek charges against violators of a federal law or to pardon
violators of a federal law. The Framers saw the separation of the
power to prosecute from the power to legislate as essential to
preserving individual liberty . . . . After enacting a statute, Congress
may not mandate the prosecution of violators of that statute.
Instead, the President’s prosecutorial discretion and pardon powers
operate as an independent protection for individual citizens against
the enforcement of oppressive laws that Congress may have passed
(and still further protection comes from later review by an
independent jury and Judiciary in those prosecutions brought by the
Executive).44

Judge Kavanaugh understood that prosecutorial discretion limits the
judiciary’s power to order prosecution of a particular individual on the
basis of a statute that mandates universal prosecution. The courts may
not aggrandize their authority by assuming prosecutorial functions that
have constitutionally been assigned to the executive branch.
Other courts concur that prosecution is a purely executive function
that may not be exercised by the courts.45 In no case has any court ever

44. In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255, 390 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original).
45. Indeed, the courts have occasionally expounded at some length on this constitutional
principle, even when it might not have been entirely necessary. For example, in Smith v. United
States, 375 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841 (1967), the court of appeals upheld
the dismissal of a Federal Tort Claims Act suit against the United States for failure to prosecute
individuals whom the plaintiff alleged were interfering with and injuring the plaintiff’s business.
Id. at 244. In holding that the prosecutor’s decision not to bring a criminal case was protected by
the discretionary function exception of the FTCA, the Court held: “The President [of] the United
States is charged in Article 2, Section 3 of the Constitution with the duty to ‘take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed . . . .’” Id. at 246. “The Attorney General is the President’s surrogate
in the prosecution in all offenses against the United States. The discretion of the Attorney
General in choosing whether to prosecute or not to prosecute, or to abandon a prosecution
already started, is absolute . . . . This discretion is required in all cases.” Id. at 246–47; see also
Goldberg v. Hoffman, 225 F.2d 463, 464–65 (7th Cir. 1955) (granting a U.S. Attorney’s motion to
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directly ordered the executive branch to commence a prosecution.46
Thus, case law supports the general proposition that the executive
alone may make the prosecutorial decision to bring a criminal case and
that the courts may not override that decision.
C. Judicial Exceptions to the Executive’s Exclusive Prosecutorial
Discretion
Notwithstanding the above doctrine, the executive does not have
absolute control over all prosecutorial decisions. First, there are certain
judicially recognized exceptions to the absolute authority of a
prosecutor which have allowed courts to challenge prosecutorial
inaction and review a prosecutor’s decision to dismiss a case that has
already been brought. Second, the Supreme Court has permitted trial
courts to initiate prosecutions for criminal contempt of court in
situations where parties have violated court orders.
The courts have been empowered to restrict the scope of
prosecutorial discretion in certain limited instances. By and large,
however, these instances involve the imposition of external restrictions
on the unlimited freedom of the executive branch to make
prosecutorial decisions rather than grants of authority to the judicial
branch to initiate prosecutorial action. For example, the Supreme Court
has suggested that there are constitutional restrictions against selective
prosecution based on the exercise of a protected constitutional right.47
As previously indicated, these cases do not pose significant separation
of powers problems because they do not transfer executive power to
another branch and thereby increase the concentration of authority in
the coordinate branch. Instead, these cases simply recognize

dismiss in a mandamus suit that sought to enjoin the prosecution of a particular criminal case
because requiring the U.S. Attorney to do so was beyond the power of the court).
46. But see Young v. United States ex rel Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 794 (1987)
(approving the appointment by a court of a special prosecutor to prosecute criminal contempt of
court).
47. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 610 (1985) (requiring that a party claiming a
prosecutorial equal protection violation show “that the passive enforcement system had a
discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose”); Oyler v. Boles, 368
U.S. 448, 456 (1962) (finding no equal protection violation for the state prosecutor’s selective
prosecution of a habitual offender statute because there was no allegation that there was selective
enforcement based on “race, religion, or other arbitrary classification”); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886) (recognizing an equal protection violation when a race-neutral law is
administered in a discriminatory way); see also United States v. Murdock, 548 F.2d 599, 600 (5th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Cammisano, 546 F.2d 238, 241 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Berrios,
501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974).
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constitutional restraints upon the authority of the executive to take
prosecutorial action.48
Rule 48(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure creates
another potential limitation on prosecutorial discretion. The rule limits
the power of the Attorney General or the United States Attorney to
dismiss a prosecution in a case that has already been brought before
the courts.49 In particular, a federal prosecutor may not dismiss a case
simply by filing a nolle prosequi, only to prosecute the same case at a
later date.
Rule 48 was adopted principally “to protect a defendant against
prosecutorial harassment, e.g., charging, dismissing, and recharging
when the Government moves to dismiss an indictment over the
defendant’s objection.”50 The lower courts do not agree on the extent
to which Rule 48(a) allows courts to refuse a request to dismiss an
indictment, even with the defendant’s consent, and the Supreme Court
has not yet resolved this issue.51 The courts seem to recognize, however,
that the purpose of Rule 48(a) is to protect against prosecutorial

48. A slightly different problem is presented by decisions ordering the executive branch to
enforce criminal statutes that were being generally ignored. See Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676,
679–82 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam)
(en banc); N.A.A.C.P. v. Levi, 418 F. Supp. 1109, 1115–17 (D.D.C. 1976). For example, in Nader,
the plaintiffs challenged the general failure of the Department of Justice to bring any prosecutions
under the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 43 Stat. 1070 et seq., 2 U.S.C. former §§ 241–56, repealed
by, the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), Pub. L. 92–225, Title IV, § 405, Feb. 7, 1972, 86
Stat. 20. The court of appeals, in upholding the lower court’s dismissal based on standing,
indicated in dictum that “established precedents [do not] necessarily foreclose judicial review” of
such non-prosecution policies suggesting they “lie outside the constitutional and statutory limits
of ‘prosecutorial discretion.’” Nader, 497 F.2d at 679. The complaint did not ask the court to
determine whether “a particular violator should be prosecuted” but, rather, review the
Department’s total failure to enforce a criminal statute. Id. Thus, cases like Nader reaffirm, rather
than weaken, the judicial reluctance to grant a prosecutorial power to a branch other than the
executive.
49. FED. R. CRIM P. 48(a) (“The government may, with leave of court, dismiss an indictment,
information, or complaint. The government may not dismiss the prosecution during trial without
the defendant’s consent.”).
50. Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 29 n.15 (1977); see also United States v. Hayden,
860 F.2d 1483, 1487–89 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Abreu, 747 F. Supp. 493, 502 (N.D. Ind.
1990) (citations omitted) (“The primary purpose of the Rule 48(a) requirement that leave of court
be obtained before dismissing charges ‘is [the] protection of defendant’s rights . . . “to prevent
harassment of a defendant by charging, dismissing, and re-charging without placing a defendant
in jeopardy”.’” (internal citations omitted)).
51. United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1468 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Weber,
721 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Hamm, 659 F.2d 624, 632 (5th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 507–08 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976); United
States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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abuses, not to transfer prosecutorial power to the judicial branch. The
Fifth Circuit has stated:
The rule was not promulgated to shift absolute power from the
Executive to the Judicial Branch. Rather, it was intended as a power
to check power. The Executive remains the absolute judge of
whether a prosecution should be initiated and the first and
presumptively the best judge of whether a pending prosecution be
terminated.52

Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has stated that the constitutionality of Rule
48(a) is dependent upon the prosecutor’s discretion not to commence
a case in the first place.53 Even in cases where courts have asserted some
authority to deny leave to dismiss, they have doubted their
constitutional power to order the executive to proceed with a
prosecution. Judge Weinfeld concluded that if the government failed to
proceed with a prosecution after refusal of leave to dismiss an
indictment, the court “would be without power to issue mandamus or
other order to compel prosecution of the indictment since a direction
would invade the traditional separation of powers doctrine.”54 Thus, the
case law interpreting Rule 48(a) also supports the proposition that
federal prosecutors retain sole power to decide whom to prosecute.
The only significant exception to the consistent refusal to allow
federal courts to initiate prosecutions is contained in the Supreme
Court’s decision in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et. Fils S.A.55 In
Young, the Court considered whether federal trial courts have the
inherent authority to initiate prosecutions for criminal contempt of
court.56 The Court concluded that the courts have such power pursuant
to Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
provides for disposition of criminal contempt upon notice and
hearing.57 The Court explained that the federal courts would be at the
mercy of other branches if they were without the authority to initiate
prosecutions for violations of their own injunctions:

52. Cowan, 524 F.2d at 513.
53. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171–72 (5th Cir. 1965) (en banc), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 935 (1965).
54. United States v. Greater Blouse, Skirt and Neckwear Contractors Ass’n, 228 F. Supp.
483, 489 (S.D.N.Y 1964); accord Cowan, 524 F.2d at 511 (“The result is that although the court is
authorized to deny the motion to dismiss in the public interest, it is nevertheless constitutionally
powerless to compel the government to proceed.”).
55. 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
56. Id. at 792.
57. Id. at 794.
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The ability to punish disobedience to judicial orders is regarded as
essential in ensuring that the Judiciary has a means to vindicate its
own authority without complete dependence on other branches. If
a party can make himself a judge of the validity of orders which have
been issued, and by his own act of disobedience set them aside, then
are the courts impotent, and what the Constitution now fittingly
calls “the judicial power of the United States” would be a mere
mockery. Courts cannot be at the mercy of another branch in
deciding whether such proceedings should be initiated. The ability
to appoint a private attorney to prosecute a contempt action
satisfies the need for an independent means of self-protection,
without which the courts would be mere boards of arbitration whose
judgments and decrees would be only advisory.58

The Court emphasized, however, that a prosecution for criminal
contempt in this manner should be a measure of last resort, and the
Court suggested that a court should consider the imposition of criminal
contempt “only if the civil remedy is deemed inadequate.”59 In
addition, the Court noted that a trial court ordinarily should first
request the appropriate prosecuting authority to initiate the criminal
contempt proceeding. Only when the prosecuting officials in the
United States Attorney’s office fail to initiate criminal actions should a
court appoint its own prosecutor.60 The Court underscored the need for
judicial restraint because “the rationale for the appointment authority
is necessity. If the Judiciary were completely dependent on the
Executive Branch to redress direct affronts to its authority, it would be
powerless to protect itself if that branch declined prosecution.”61

58. Id. at 796 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
59. Id. at 801. In a subsequent case, the Court upheld statutory restrictions on the authority
of an independent prosecutor to file a petition for certiorari without approval by the Solicitor
General. United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 708 (1988). Thus, a contempt
prosecution is subject to some control by the executive branch, at least at the Supreme Court
level.
60. Young, 481 U.S. at 801–02. In a later case, the Court noted that “[u]nder the procedures
set out in Young, it seems evident that the majority of contempt cases will be prosecuted by the
United States Attorney.” Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. at 706.
61. Young, 481 U.S. at 801. Justice Scalia’s concurrence vigorously contested the majority’s
conclusion that a court may appoint a prosecutor for a criminal contempt of court by attacking
the assumption that the executive’s decision to decline to prosecute a contempt of court would
render the judiciary impotent and thus improperly subject to executive branch control. To the
contrary:
[T]he ability of the executive branch to block a prosecution for criminal contempt of
court is a carefully designed and critical element of our system of Government. There
are numerous instances in which the Constitution leaves open the theoretical possibility
that the actions of one Branch may be brought to naught by the actions or inactions of
another. Such dispersion of power was central to the scheme of forming a Government
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This exception for criminal contempt of court does not significantly
diminish the general conclusion that judicial power cannot extend to
the selection of individuals for prosecution. This is because Young did
not hold that trial courts can require the executive to prosecute
criminal contempt cases or that the courts have the power to enforce
such a requirement.62 What is important to keep in mind is that the
separation of powers rationale for restricting the power of selecting
individuals for prosecution to the executive branch rests not only on
the idea that the branch is better suited to exercise prosecutorial
discretion, but also on the more fundamental principle that all three
branches must exercise independent judgments before a person can be
punished under federal criminal law. Young stands only for the limited
proposition that the Constitution does not deprive courts of the
traditional methods for enforcing compliance with their own orders.
The general limitation on judicial initiation of prosecutions remains
intact because, if the courts were to usurp the executive’s role in
selecting individuals for prosecution, then one of the essential checks
on government power would be lost.
D. Conclusions about Prosecutorial Independence from the Judicial
Branch
The Constitution prescribes that the judicial branch’s only role in
the criminal justice process is to determine individual guilt or
innocence and impose appropriate punishment. The courts play no role
in the creation of federal crimes; that is a power exclusively reserved to
Congress. Similarly, the courts play no role in the selection of
individuals for prosecution, a power that is exclusively reserved to the
executive branch. This constitutional division of authority protects
individual liberty by imposing a check on federal power that requires
all three branches to perform their separate constitutional duty before
any individual may be subjected to criminal punishment.

with enough power to serve the expansive purposes set forth in the preamble of the
Constitution, yet one that would ‘secure the blessings of liberty’ rather than use its
power tyrannically.
Id. at 817 (Scalia, J., concurring).
62. Todd D. Peterson, Prosecuting Executive Branch Officials for Contempt of Congress, 66
N.Y.U. L. REV. 563, 603 (1991) [hereinafter Peterson, Contempt of Congress].
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III. FEDERAL PROSECUTORIAL INDEPENDENCE FROM THE
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
Similar constraints prevent the legislative branch from mandating
the prosecution of particular cases. Indeed, because Congress is such a
politically responsive body, the dangers of politically motivated
prosecutions make the restrictions on Congress even more potent than
the restrictions on the federal courts. This section will first examine the
general prohibition on congressional initiation of prosecutions. It will
then turn to the strict applications of the prohibition that apply even in
the case of criminal contempt of Congress citations and congressional
oversight of open criminal investigations.
A. Congressional Power to Initiate Criminal Investigations or Cases
The same constitutional principles that prohibit judicial
participation in the decision to prosecute apply more strongly to
Congress, which, because of its highly politicized nature, could threaten
the integrity of a criminal investigation. In upholding the independent
counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act, the Supreme
Court relied heavily on the fact that the statute gave Congress no
formal role in selecting individuals for prosecution, nor any control
over the selection or removal of the independent counsel.63 The Court
noted with respect to the removal power:
This case does not involve an attempt by Congress itself to gain a
role in the removal of executive officials other than its established
powers of impeachment and conviction. The Act instead puts the
removal power squarely in the hands of the Executive Branch; an
independent counsel may be removed from office only by the
personal action of the Attorney General, and only for good cause.
There is no requirement of congressional approval of the Attorney
General’s removal decision, though the decision is subject to judicial
review.64

With respect to the issue whether the statute created an impermissible
aggrandizement of Congress’s powers, the Court stated:
We observe first that this case does not involve an attempt by
Congress to increase its own powers at the expense of the Executive

63. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685–93 (1988) (“[T]his case does not involve an
attempt by Congress itself to gain a role in the removal of executive officials.”); id. at 693–96
(“The Act does empower certain Members of Congress to request the Attorney General to apply
for the appointment of an independent counsel . . . .”).
64. Id. at 685 (citations, footnotes, and internal quotations omitted).
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Branch . . . . Indeed, with the exception of the power of
impeachment—which applies to all officers of the United States—
Congress retained for itself no powers of control or supervision over
an independent counsel. The Act does empower certain Members
of Congress to request the Attorney General to apply for the
appointment of an independent counsel, but the Attorney General
has no duty to comply with the request, although he must respond
within a certain time limit.65

The clear implication of the Court’s opinion is that, had the statute
given Congress authority to appoint, remove, or control the
independent counsel, it would have created a serious constitutional
problem.66 Under our constitutional scheme, there simply is no role for
Congress in the prosecution of individual cases.67 The Founders
recognized that the combination of legislative and prosecutorial power
is a much more explosive mixture than the combination of judicial and
prosecutorial power because the former would likely lead to the abuse
of power due to the highly political nature of the legislature.68 Madison
argued:
[I]n a representative republic, where the executive magistracy is
carefully limited both in the extent and the duration of its power;
and where the legislative power is exercised by an assembly, which
is inspired by a supposed influence over the people with an intrepid
confidence in its own strength; which is sufficiently numerous to feel
all the passions which actuate a multitude; yet not so numerous as
to be incapable of pursuing the objects of its passions, by means
which reason prescribes; it is against the enterprising ambition of
this department, that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy
and exhaust all their precautions.69

Madison and others particularly feared that the judicial power of
determining individual guilt or innocence might be usurped by the
legislature.70

65. Id. at 694 (citations omitted).
66. See Peterson, Procedural Checks, supra note 35, at 221 (explaining that the limitation on
the President’s power to remove the independent counsel did not present remotely as significant
a constitutional issue as would a provision giving power to Congress to appoint or direct a
prosecutor).
67. See In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255, 264 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (stating that “[a]fter enacting
a statute, Congress may not mandate the prosecution of violators of that statute” and the
President has “prosecutorial discretion and pardon powers” as a mechanism to protect citizens
from “oppressive laws” and further protected “by an independent jury and Judiciary”).
68. Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 435 (1987).
69. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 333–34 (James Madison) (J. Cooke Ed., 1961).
70. Id. at 337; see also THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 195 (stating
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The Constitution reflects this suspicion of any legislative
involvement in the adjudication of individual guilt or innocence, as
evidenced in the Bill of Attainder Clause.71 Historically, Sixteenth
Century Parliament would single out and punish the political enemies
of the Crown.72 The Clause’s inclusion in the Constitution
demonstrates the Framers’ deep distrust of any legislative involvement
in determinations of individual guilt or innocence, and it explains the
Framers’ specific constitutional remedy of separating the functions
involved in the prosecution and conviction of crimes.73 In the Court’s
words, the Clause serves as a “bulwark against tyranny.”74
Given these strong constitutional policies, the Supreme Court has
consistently ruled that Congress’s role is to adopt legislation of general
applicability. These laws are applied and implemented by the executive
branch, and adjudications of individual guilt or innocence remain in the
realm of the judiciary: “It is the peculiar province of the legislature to
prescribe general rules for the government of society; the application
of those rules to individuals in society would seem to be the duty of
other departments.”75 This conclusion reflects a clear understanding of
the dangers posed by the involvement of the most political branch in
any aspects of the determination of individual guilt or innocence. As
the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Lovett,76
Those who wrote our Constitution well knew the danger inherent in
special legislative acts which take away the life, liberty, or property
of particular named persons, because the legislature thinks them
guilty of conduct which deserves punishment.77

Of course, legislative control over prosecution of a crime would not
in and of itself constitute a bill of attainder. Nevertheless, the Bill of
Attainder Clause, the cases interpreting that clause, and the other
expressions of constitutional concern over any legislative involvement
that the Legislature “has accordingly in many instances decided rights which should have been left
to judicial controversy . . . .”(emphasis added)).
71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442–46 (1965); United
States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 316–18 (1946).
72. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 441–42.
73. Paul Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law and the Idea of Independence, 30
WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 308–09 (1989).
74. Brown, 381 U.S. at 443.
75. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 136 (1810); see also Brown, 381 U.S. at 446 (quoting Peck,
10 U.S. at 136).
76. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
77. Id. at 317; see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 961 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (“The
Framers were well acquainted with the danger of subjecting the determination of the rights of one
person to the ‘tyranny of shifting majorities.’”).
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in the determination of individual guilt or innocence suggest that there
are powerful constitutional problems with any legislative involvement
in the criminal adjudication process other than passing statutes of
general applicability. Because Congress is far less isolated than the
courts from political pressures, allowing it to participate in
prosecutorial decisions presents dangerous risks of politically
motivated decision-making.78
B. Prosecutorial Discretion Under the Criminal Contempt of Congress
Statute
Congress lacks the power to initiate a prosecution even in cases of
criminal contempt of Congress, despite arguments that the criminal
contempt statute could be construed to require the executive to act and
that Congress must be able to mandate prosecution to protect its
constitutional prerogatives. The criminal contempt of Congress statute
contains two principal sections, United States Code Title 2, sections 192
and 194. Section 192, which sets forth the criminal offense of contempt
of Congress, makes it a misdemeanor for any summoned witness before
either House of Congress or its committees to “willfully . . . default, or
who, having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the
question under inquiry.”79 Section 194 purports to impose duties on the
Speaker of the House or the President of the Senate, as the case may
be, and the United States Attorney, to take certain actions leading to
the prosecution of persons certified by a House of Congress to have
failed to produce information in response to a subpoena. It provides
that if a witness fails to provide subpoenaed documents or testimony
and the House or Senate adopts a contempt of Congress resolution:
it shall be the duty of the said President of the Senate or the Speaker
of the House, as the case may be, to certify, and he shall so certify,
the statement of facts aforesaid under the seal of the Senate or
House, as the case may be, to the appropriate United States Attorney,

78. See supra Part I. It does not seem to be a persuasive defense against this point to suggest
that the executive branch may bring prosecutions for politically motivated reasons as well. It is,
of course, possible that political considerations may play a role in some executive branch
prosecutorial decisions, although there are both constitutional and customary restrictions on such
influence. It hardly warrants a concession to congressional political influence of the prosecutorial
process to suggest that there have been executive abuses in the past. Surely the separation of
powers, if it has any meaning, is designed to keep the branches within certain bounds in order to
minimize the chances for abuse of power. That abuses may occur is no justification for ignoring
the protections that the separation of powers was designed to provide.
79. 2 U.S.C. § 192 (2018) (emphasis added).
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whose duty it shall be to bring the matter before the Grand Jury for
its action.80

Section 194 does not expressly require the United States Attorney
to bring a contempt prosecution or even sign an indictment with
respect to individuals cited for contempt of Congress. The statute refers
simply to the “duty” of the United States Attorney to bring the matter
“before the grand jury for its action.” Many members of Congress,
however, have insisted that, at the very least, the United States
Attorney must submit every contempt-of-Congress citation to a grand
jury for possible indictment.81 Several commentators have agreed with
Congress and argued that the statute divests the United States
Attorney of any discretion in deciding whether to refer a contempt-ofCongress citation to a grand jury.82 One commentator summed up this
position as follows:
The duties of the executive under § 194 are mandatory. The statute
calls on the executive, as the enforcer of the laws, to act as a
necessary conduit between the legislative and judicial branches. The
required action involves neither independent judgment of guilt or
innocence nor a great expenditure of time, effort, or expense. It
simply requires a presentation of a contempt citation to a grand jury.
The allegation that discretion exists is without legal or logical
foundation.83

Notwithstanding these arguments, the constitutional concerns
about congressional influence over individual prosecutions are so
strong that they apply even in the case of criminal contempt of

80. 2 U.S.C. § 194 (2018) (emphasis added).
81. For example, during the dispute between the U.S. House of Representatives and the
Department of Justice over a congressional subpoena to the EPA, House officials argued that the
United States Attorney was required to present the contempt of Congress citation to the grand
jury. See Leslie Maitland, Administration Battles Citation of E.P.A. Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18,
1982, at 1 (“The House resolution directed the United States Attorney for the District of
Columbia to present a criminal contempt case against Mrs. Gorsuch to a grand jury.”); see also
Peterson, Congressional Oversight, supra note 10, at 1398–1401 (describing the House contempt
citation process against EPA Administrator Gorsuch).
82. Stanley Brand, the former General Counsel to the Clerk of the House of
Representatives, has urged: “[T]he better argument is that [S]ection 194 requires that all witnesses
cited by a House of Congress for contempt and referred to the United States Attorney be brought
before the grand jury.” Stanley M. Brand & Sean Connelly, Constitutional Confrontations:
Preserving a Prompt and Orderly Means by Which Congress May Enforce Investigative Demands
Against Executive Branch Officials, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 71, 86–87 (1986) [hereinafter Brand &
Connelly].
83. Robert E. Palmer, Note, The Confrontation of the Legislative and Executive Branches:
An Examination of the Constitutional Balance of Powers and the Role of the Attorney General, 11
PEPP. L. REV. 331, 357–58 (1984).
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Congress. The Department of Justice traditionally has taken the view
that the United States Attorney retains the discretion to decide
whether to refer a contempt-of-Congress citation to a grand jury.84
Although notable cases of executive non-referral have been rare, there
have been instances in which the DOJ has declined to refer contempt
citations to the grand jury. One such instance occurred in 1960 in the
context of another dispute with a government agency over
congressional access to documents. In that case, the Port of New York
Authority (which had been established by an interstate compact
approved by Congress) asserted, on instructions from the Governors of
New York and New Jersey, a claim of privilege in response to a
Judiciary Committee subpoena for a large number of documents
concerning the Port Authority’s operations. As a result of the Port
Authority’s failure to produce documents, the House approved
contempt-of-Congress citations against three of the Authority’s
principal officers.85 Although Congress referred the contempt
resolutions to the United States Attorney for prosecution,86 the United
States Attorney never referred any of the contempt citations to a grand
jury. One of the three officials was ultimately prosecuted by
information rather than indictment, while the remaining two were
never prosecuted in spite of congressional demands to refer all three to
a grand jury for indictment.87 Thus, the Department used its

84. For example, in the brief filed by the Department of Justice in United States v. House of
Representatives, the Department argued that “Section 194 does not require the United States
Attorney to initiate a prosecution.” H.R. Rep. No. 99-435, at 1610 (1985).
85. See 106 CONG. REC. 17258, 17281 (1960) (recommending a citation against Austin J.
Tobin, Executive Director of the Authority); 106 CONG. REC. 17258, 17316 (1960) (offering a
privileged resolution against S. Sloan Colt, Chairman of the Board of Directors); 106 CONG. REC.
17258, 17319 (1960) (recommending citation against Joseph G. Carty, Secretary). The contempt
resolution in each case reads as follows:
Resolved, that the speaker of the House of Representatives certify the report of the
Committee on the Judiciary as to the contumacious conduct of [name] in failing and
refusing to furnish certain documents in compliance with a subpoena duces tecum of a
duly constituted subcommittee of said committee served upon him and as ordered by
the subcommittee, together with all of the facts in connection therewith, under seal of
the House of Representatives, to the United States Attorney for the District of
Columbia, to the end that [name] may be proceeded against in the manner and form
provided by law.
86. See C.P. Trussell, House Cites Three in Port Authority in Contempt Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 24, 1960, at 1 (“The question of contempt of Congress now goes to the Department of Justice
with a House recommendation that the matter be handled ‘in the manner and form provided by
law.’”).
87. See Alvin Shuster, Port Board Chief is Accused by U.S. in Contempt Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 26, 1960, at 1 (describing the contempt-of-Congress process).
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prosecutorial discretion to insulate specific individuals from
prosecution for contempt of Congress.
Department of Justice officials have reiterated this view in
congressional testimony and OLC opinions. In congressional testimony
given in 1976, the Department took the position that if an executive
officer were cited for contempt because of an assertion of executive
privilege and “the Department determined to its satisfaction that the
claim was rightfully made, it would not, in the exercise of its
prosecutorial discretion, present the matter to a grand jury.”88 In 1984,
OLC, in an opinion signed by Assistant Attorney General Theodore
Olson, concluded not only that the Constitution prohibits Congress
from mandating an individual contempt prosecution, but that it also
prohibits Congress from requiring the Department of Justice to refer a
contempt-of-Congress citation to a grand jury.89
For a number of reasons, the Department’s opinion seems to be
clearly correct.90 First, in several cases the D.C. Circuit has assumed that
the United States Attorney retains some discretion in deciding whether
to refer a citation for contempt of Congress to a grand jury where they
refused to entertain pre-enforcement challenges to congressional
subpoenas. These decisions rested in part on the ground that the
subpoenaed witness would have a chance to persuade the Unites States
Attorney not to prosecute if the witness were subsequently cited for
contempt of Congress. For example, in Ansara v. Eastland, the D.C.
Circuit dismissed a suit to quash a congressional subpoena on the
ground that interfering with an ongoing congressional investigation
would be an inappropriate exercise of its equitable power.91 The court
concluded that a subpoenaed witness would not be greatly prejudiced
by the absence of judicial relief because he could find alternative
protection “within the legislative branch or elsewhere.”92 In a footnote,
the court stated that these protections could be found “perhaps in the
executive branch which may decide not to present the matter to the
88. Testimony of Assistant Attorney Gen. Rex Lee, Hearings on Representation of Congress
and Congressional Interest in Courts, Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976).
89. Olson Memorandum, supra note 19, at 102.
90. See generally Peterson, Contempt of Congress, supra note 62 (arguing that Congress
should not be able to exercise prosecutorial authority to force the executive to charge contempt
of Congress allegations).
91. See 442 F.2d 751, 754 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“[I]n the absence of establishment by Congress
of a procedure for advance judicial consideration and declaration, we do not think the courts can
soundly interject themselves in cases like this for the purpose of granting emergency relief.”).
92. Id.
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grand jury (as occurred in the case of the officials of the New York Port
Authority);93 or perhaps in the Grand Jury which may decide not to
return a true bill.”94 In United States Servicemen’s Fund v. Eastland,95
the D.C. Circuit reviewed a third-party challenge to a congressional
subpoena. The court heard the case in spite of the earlier precedents
denying pre-enforcement review, because, in part, the plaintiffs would
have no opportunity to vindicate their rights through a contempt
proceeding in which they might “seek to convince the executive (the
Attorney General’s representative) not to prosecute . . . .”96
Significantly, these cases emphasize the importance of allowing a
potential defendant the ability to persuade a federal prosecutor not to
press charges, which preserves the requirement that all three branches
maintain their independent roles in the federal criminal justice system.
Nevertheless, given the holding of Young, where the Supreme
Court allowed federal courts to appoint prosecutors for criminal
contempt of court,97 one could argue that Congress needs the right to
require prosecution of its own contempt cases. After all, if the courts
are empowered to appoint prosecutors to bring criminal contempt
charges against those who interfere with a court’s ability to carry out
its constitutional functions, perhaps Congress has a correlative right to
prosecute those who interfere with Congress’s ability to carry out its
own constitutional mandate. This appealing notion should be resisted,
however, because the branches of the federal government are not
symmetrical; each is unique in the powers it possesses and the extent to
which it reflects and responds to political pressure. Because each
branch is unique, the constitutional concerns about the potential abuse
of power differ from branch to branch. The constitutional authority that
93. Id. Several articles have questioned the persuasiveness of this decision on the ground
that “the Court’s language in Ansara is somewhat mysterious in view of the fact that there does
not appear to be any such Port Authority case in which grand jury presentment failed to occur
following congressional referral.” Brand & Connelly, supra note 82, at 86 n. 109; see also James
Hamilton & John C. Grabow, A Legislature Proposal for Resolving Executive Privilege Disputes
Precipitated by Congressional Subpoenas, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 145, 154 n.58 (1984) (“It is
unclear what case the D.C. Circuit was referring to in this rather cryptic statement, for it cited no
case involving the New York Port Authority.”). It seems clear, however, that the Court of
Appeals was referring to the contempt citations of Austin J. Tobin, Executive Director of the Port
Authority, Sloan Colt, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Port Authority and Joseph G.
Carty, the Secretary of the Port Authority, who were cited for contempt of Congress in 1960.
None of these contempt citations were ever referred to the grand jury and only one was ever
prosecuted. See infra text accompanying notes 98–89.
94. Ansara, 442 F.2d at 754 n.6.
95. 488 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev’d on other grounds, 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
96. Id. at 1260.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 54–60.
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may be necessary and appropriate for the judicial branch may be
unnecessary and potentially dangerous in the hands of the legislature.
For several reasons, this is the case with respect to prosecutions for
contempt of Congress.
First, the courts have a greater need to initiate a contempt
prosecution than Congress, which is amply empowered to protect its
prerogatives by political means that are not available to the courts. The
Court in Young seemed to be responding to fears about the judiciary’s
inability to protect itself, a fear that dates back to the adoption of the
Constitution. In one of the best-known passages from the Federalist,
Hamilton declared:
[T]he judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the
least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it
will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them . . . . The
judiciary . . . has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no
direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and
can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have
neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment; and must ultimately
depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of
its judgments.98

Unlike the courts, Congress has ample weapons to utilize against the
President if it concludes the executive branch is preventing it from
performing its functions. The history of executive disputes provides a
classic example of the power of Congress’s access to the press as a
means to mobilize political power against the executive branch.99 If
Congress has the political will to persevere in an investigation, it
virtually always wins and is able to obtain the records that it
legitimately needs.100
Not only does Congress have less of a need to mandate contempt
prosecution, but the dangers of allowing Congress to mandate a
prosecution are significantly greater. The federal district courts are
relatively more immune from political pressure, as they are governed
by precedent and subject to review by courts of appeals. Thus, although
the concentration of prosecutorial power together with judicial
authority is not without significant dangers, the accumulation of powers
98. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 522–23 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961).
99. See Todd David Peterson, Contempt of Congress v. Executive Privilege, 14 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 77, 139–46 (2011) (describing how Congress used the media, its advice and consent
power, and negotiations to obtain the information it wanted from the Executive).
100. See id. (noting that the Congresses during the Reagan, Clinton, and the George W. Bush
administrations were able to obtain the information and documents they wanted).
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is not as volatile as it would be in a more political context. The
constitutional separation of powers contemplates that there will not
only be one check before conviction is possible, but two; the judicial
branch must convict after the executive branch has decided to
prosecute. Regardless of whether Young is correctly decided, it need
not be extended to contempt of Congress, where the need for such
additional power is far less than it is in the case of the judiciary and the
potential for political abuse is so much greater.
C. Congressional Oversight of Criminal Investigations
The rationale for limiting Congress’s power to initiate or control
any criminal investigation applies even in the context of oversight
hearings. Congressional disclosure of information obtained from open
criminal investigations has the real potential to apply inappropriate
political pressure on the prosecutorial decision-making process. As
former Senator Carl Levin explained:
Only the executive branch has the constitutional authority to
prosecute. Congress can, when it comes across what it thinks is
criminal activity, refer a matter to the Justice Department for
possible prosecution, but its role and authority stops there. Should
it seek to try to influence the discretionary authority of the
executive branch in a prosecutorial matter, the third branch of
government, the judiciary, could throw out the prosecution based on
political influence.101

Because of the potential for undue political influence and numerous
other problems, the Department of Justice has traditionally refused to
disclose to Congress any information from open criminal investigation
files.102
The Department’s position was first explained in a 1941 opinion by
Attorney General Robert H. Jackson.103 Jackson’s opinion took the
form of a response to a request from the Chair of the House Committee
on Naval Affairs for FBI and Department of Justice “reports,
memoranda, and correspondence . . . in connection with ‘investigations

101. Carl Levin, Congress Dangerously Wields its Oversight Power in Russia Probe, THE HILL
(May 15, 2018, 7:00 AM), http://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/387648-congress-dangerouslywields-its-oversight-power-in-russia-probe.
102. See Peterson, Congressional Oversight, supra note 10, at 1385–1411 (describing how there
is little precedent of the Executive providing Congress with information from open criminal
investigations).
103. Position of the Executive Department Regarding Investigative Reports, 40 Op. Atty. Gen.
45, 1941 WL 1875 (Jackson, A.G.).
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made by the Department of Justice arising out of’ labor disputes at
businesses with naval contracts.”104 Attorney General Jackson rejected
the request and cited examples, dating back to 1904, in which the
Attorney General had refused to disclose information from open
criminal investigative files.105 These refusals were, in Jackson’s view,
consistent with other instances in which the executive branch had
asserted privilege in response to congressional requests for
information.106 The Attorney General concluded that the information
sought by Congress was “chiefly valuable, for use by the Executive
Branch of the Government in the executions of the laws. It can be of
little, if any, value with the framing of legislation or with a performance
of any other constitutional duty [by] Congress . . . . Certainly, the evil
which would necessarily flow from its untimely publication would far
outweigh any possible good.”107
In a 1969 opinion, the Office of Legal Counsel stated that the reason
for protecting information from open criminal investigations was to
protect against potential improper congressional influence. “The
executive cannot effectively investigate if Congress is, in a sense, a
partner in the investigation. If a congressional committee is fully
apprised of all details of an investigation as the investigation proceeds,
there are substantial dangers that congressional pressures will
influence the course of the investigation.”108 In order to protect
potential defendants from politically motivated prosecutions, Congress
must not be involved in any open criminal investigations.
OLC reiterated this position in a 1986 opinion for the Attorney
General concerning congressional requests for information regarding
decisions made under the Independent Counsel Act.109 In that opinion,

104. Id. at 45.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 50. Attorney General Herbert Brownell reaffirmed the policy set forth in the
Jackson opinion in 1956. See May 15, 1956 Memorandum of Attorney General Brownell,
reprinted in Mercury Pollution and Enforcement of the Refuse Act of 1899: Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Conservation and Natural Resources of the House Committee on Government
Operations, Part I, 92d Cong. 26–27 (1971). Attorney General Brownell permitted disclosures
from certain closed files, but stated that with respect to open cases, “the file may not be available
for examination by the committee’s representative.” Id.
108. Congressional Subpoenas of Department of Justice Investigations, 8 Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 252, 263 (1984), 1984 WL 178369 (quoting Memorandum for Edward L. Morgan, Deputy
Counsel to the President, from Thomas E. Kauper, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office
of Legal Counsel, Re: Submission of Open CID Investigation Files 2 (Dec. 19, 1969)).
109. Response to Congressional Requests for Information Regarding Decisions Made Under
the Independent Counsel Act, 10 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 68, 68 (1986).
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Assistant Attorney General Charles Cooper recognized that Congress
had a “legitimate legislative interest in overseeing the Department’s
enforcement of the Independent Counsel Act and relevant criminal
statutes in determining whether legislative revisions to the act should
be made.”110 Cooper warned, however, that “Congress could not justify
an investigation based on its disagreement with the prosecutorial
decision regarding appointment of an independent counsel for a
particular individual. Congress simply cannot constitutionally second
guess that decision.”111 Even where Congress has a general legislative
interest in reviewing the implementation of a statute, Cooper stated,
“the policy of the Executive Branch throughout the Nation’s history
has generally been to decline to provide committees of Congress with
access to, or copies of, open law enforcement files except in
extraordinary circumstances.”112 Open files must be protected in order
to avoid congressional pressures that might unduly influence an
investigation given the “well-founded fears that the perception of the
integrity, impartiality, and fairness of the law enforcement process as a
whole will be damaged if sensitive material is distributed beyond those
persons necessarily involved in the investigation and prosecution
process.”113
In 1993, former Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti explained and
further developed the traditional position of the Department of
Justice.114 In a speech at the Heritage Foundation, Civiletti cited a
House investigation of the Department’s Environmental Crimes Unit
and protested the Department’s decision to make line attorneys
available for congressional questioning.115 Attorney General Civiletti
explained that the Constitution vests the decision on whom to
prosecute in the executive branch and does not permit Congress to
influence the Department’s decisions in individual cases.116 According
to Civiletti, congressional involvement in individual cases presents the

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 74.
Id.
Id. at 76.
Id.
Benjamin R. Civiletti, Justice Unbalanced: Congress and Prosecutorial Discretion, THE
HERITAGE LECTURES NO. 472, 1 (Nov. 12, 1993), https://www.heritage.org/politicalprocess/report/justice-unbalanced-congress-and-prosecutorial-discretion [hereinafter Civiletti].
115. See id.; see also Jerry Seper, Hill Probe of Justice Lawyers Hampers Agency, Civiletti
Says, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1993, at A4 (“Mr. Civiletti said the ruling . . . will undermine the
power of the executive branch of government to carry out its constitutionally assigned role.”).
116. Civiletti, supra note 114, at 34.
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risk of improper political influence in an individual’s case.117 Thus, in
the Department’s view, congressional involvement threatens not only
the separation of powers, but individual liberty as well.118
Congress has, on occasion, attempted to push back against the
Department’s refusal to disclose information from open criminal
investigation files. After Attorney General Civiletti’s speech received
wide attention in the media,119 the House Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
commissioned a Congressional Research Service (“CRS”) study to
respond to Attorney General Civiletti’s views.120 This memorandum
took the position that
[N]umerous pertinent Supreme Court precedent[s] in this area,
never mentioned by Mr. Civiletti, support a broad and
encompassing power in the Congress to engage in oversight and
investigation of the administration of executive agencies that would
reach all sources of information that would enable it to carry out its
legislative function. In the absence of a countervailing constitutional
privilege or a self-imposed statutory restriction upon its authority,
the Congress, and its committees, have plenary power to compel
information needed to discharge its legislative function from
executive agencies, private persons and organizations, and, within
certain constraints, the information so obtained may be made
public.121

The CRS memorandum cited Supreme Court precedent supporting
the general investigative power of Congress and relied on “significant
historical precedent . . . for committees receiving documents and
testimony as to both open and closed cases as a result of
accommodation, voluntary or otherwise.”122 In addition, the

117. Id. at 5.
118. The framers linked the two principles together and believed that the separation of
powers provided a solid bulwark against infringements on individual liberty. Rebecca Brown,
Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1531 (1991).
119. E.g., Editorial, General Dingell, WALL STREET J., Sept. 2, 1993, at A12.
120. Morton Rosenberg, Legal and Historical Substantiality of Former Attorney General
Civiletti’s Views as to the Scope and Reach of Congress’s Authority to Conduct Oversight in the
Department of Justice, CONG. RES. SERV. (Oct. 15, 1993), reprinted in Hearing: “EPA’s Criminal
Enforcement Program,” Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on
Energy & Commerce, 103d Cong. 12–41 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 CRS Memorandum]; TODD
GARVEY, CONG. RES. SERV., RL34097, CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER AND THE
ENFORCEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL SUBPOENAS: LAW, HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE
(2017) (examining the source of the contempt power).
121. 1993 CRS Memorandum, supra note 120, at 2.
122. Id. at 6.
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memorandum relied upon case law that upheld the power of Congress
to investigate matters that were the subject of pending litigation.123
According to the CRS memorandum, the potentially prejudicial effect
that congressional hearings may have on pending cases was insufficient
to deny Congress access to material from criminal files.124
Finally, the CRS memorandum rejected the view that “prosecution
is an inherently Executive function” and that congressional access to
information related to the exercise of that function is thereby limited.125
Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. Olson, which
sustained the constitutionality of the independent counsel provisions
of the Ethics in Government Act, the CRS memorandum argued that
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion “is in no way ‘central’ to the
functioning of the executive branch.”126 Thus, the memorandum
concluded, “in the face of legitimate committee oversight there can be
no credible claim of encroachment or aggrandizement by the
legislature of essential Executive powers.”127 As a consequence, the
appropriate judicial test is one that determines whether the challenged
legislative action “prevents the executive branch from accomplishing
its assigned functions” and, if so, “whether that impact is justified by an
overriding need to promote objectives within the congressional
authority of Congress.”128 Using this test, the CRS memorandum
concluded:
Congressional oversight and access to documents in testimony,
unlike the action of a court, cannot stop a prosecution or set limits
on the management of a particular case. Access to information by
itself does not disturb the authority and discretion of the Executive
branch to decide whether to prosecute a case.129

As a result, “the fact that information is sought on the Executive’s
enforcement of criminal laws would not in itself seem to preclude
congressional inquiry.”130

123. Id at 6–7 (citing Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 294 (1929), and Delaney v. United
States, 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952)).
124. 1993 CRS Memorandum, supra note 120, at 9.
125. Id.
126. Id. (citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691–92 (1988)).
127. Id. at 11.
128. Id. (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989)).
129. Id.
130. Id.; see also Mort Rosenberg, Why Congressional Inquiries Trump Federal Investigations,
PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT, https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2018/05/why-congressionalinquiries-trump-federal-investigations/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2019, 3:32 PM) (“There appears to
be no court precedent that imposes a threshold burden on committees . . . . An inquiring
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The chief problem with the CRS position is that it fails to address
the principal rationale for blocking congressional access to open
criminal investigative files, which is the potential for improper
congressional influence over decisions about whom to prosecute. The
issue is not whether congressional access “prevents the executive
branch from accomplishing its assigned functions”; rather, the issue is
whether congressional access gives Congress the power to influence
individual cases, which is authority that should not reside in the
legislative branch. This is an aggrandizement problem, not an
interference problem, and the Supreme Court has been much more
vigilant about aggrandizement issues than it has with respect to
interference issues.131 The concern is not whether Congress impedes the
work of the Department. Rather, congressional influence presents the
risk of that politics may play a role in prosecutorial decisions that
should be based on the merits of the case alone.
Moreover, the historical record simply does not support
congressional access to open investigative files as opposed to closed
files where the potential for influencing prosecutorial decisions is not
as great. A number of factors are significant in analyzing the relevant
historical record. First, it is important to distinguish between
investigations of Department of Justice misconduct and investigations
of departmental inaction or failure to prosecute. The former types of
investigations present many fewer risks to individual rights and may
indeed serve to protect them. The latter create the risk of politically
influenced prosecutorial action, which may interfere with individual
rights. Second, one must distinguish between civil and criminal
investigations. Although there is a potential for improper congressional
influence over both, the concerns are greater in the context of criminal
investigations, which can involve much greater intrusions on individual
rights. Third, it is important to determine the stage of an investigation
at the time Congress seeks information. Here, it is not only important
to distinguish between open and closed investigations, but also between
investigations in which the Department has already secured
indictments and investigations that are still in the preliminary precommittee need only show that the information it seeks is within the broad subject matter of its
authorized jurisdiction, is in aid of a legitimate legislative function, and is pertinent to the area of
concern.”).
131. See Peterson, Procedural Checks, supra note 35, at 220–21 (describing how the Court
typically takes a functionalist approach when a statute restricts or, in other words, interferes, with
the power of a branch but a formalist approach when a statute seeks to aggrandize power in a
particular branch).
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indictment phase. In the former, the DOJ has already decided to
proceed against particular individuals, and the danger of a
congressional investigation relates principally to disclosure of a
roadmap to the prosecution’s case. In the latter, these concerns are
compounded by the much weightier concern that Congress might
influence the Department to bring a case that it might not otherwise
have decided to prosecute.
Based upon these principles, an earlier study concluded that there
were no significant historical precedents supporting Congress’s right to
obtain documents from open criminal investigations.132 Since that time,
congressional advocates have added additional investigations to the list
of proposed precedents for such investigations, most notably in an
update of the earlier Congressional Research Service report published
in 2012.133 This article examines these new precedents to determine if
any support congressional access to open criminal investigation files.
1. The Removal and Replacement of United States Attorneys in
2006
In 2006, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales controversially fired
and replaced nine United States Attorneys. In the wake of allegations
that the firings were prompted by the failure of the United States
Attorneys to initiate politically motivated investigations and
prosecutions, Congress began a series of hearings related to the
firings.134 These congressional oversight hearings ultimately generated
congressional subpoenas and an assertion of executive privilege by the

132. See Peterson, Congressional Oversight, supra note 10, at 1447–48 (“In order to prevent
[congressional interference] from occurring, the President and the DOJ should reassert the
traditional position of the DOJ that Congress may not have access to open criminal investigative
files.”).
133. See generally ALISSA M. DOLAN & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42811,
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 1920-2012: HISTORY,
LAW, AND PRACTICE (2012) (updating the 2012 CRS report) [hereinafter Dolan & Garvey].
134. See generally Restoring Checks and Balances in the Confirmation Process of United States
Attorneys: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007); Insuring Executive Branch Accountability: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
110th Cong. (2007); Continuing Investigation into the U.S. Attorneys Controversy: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. (2007); Continuing Investigation into the U.S. Attorneys Controversy and Related Matters
(Part II): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007); Continuing Investigation into the EUS Attorneys Controversy
and Related Matters (Part III): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (presenting hearings related to the
firings of U.S. Attorneys).
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President in connection with the subpoenas issued to White House
Counsel Harriet Miers and the White House Chief of Staff, Joshua
Bolten.135 After the Department of Justice refused to refer the House’s
contempt citation to a grand jury, the House filed a civil enforcement
action in federal district court.136 In that case, the D.C. federal district
court granted the Committee’s motion for partial summary judgment
and held that “Ms. Miers is not absolutely immune from congressional
process” and that she had to appear before the Committee to provide
testimony.137 Although the court clearly upheld the legitimacy of the
House Committee’s investigation, neither the subpoenas nor any other
part of the investigation dealt with open criminal investigations. Thus,
the incident does not stand as a precedent for such congressional
authority.
2. CIA Agent Identity Leak
After columnist Robert Novak wrote a column that revealed the
identity of Valerie Plame Wilson, a covert CIA agent, the FBI
commenced an investigation into whether the White House had
illegally disclosed Plame’s identity.138 The disclosure was in retaliation
for remarks made by her husband, former U.S. ambassador Joseph
Wilson, which were critical of the Bush Administration.139 In 2007, Vice
President Cheney’s chief of staff, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, was
convicted of perjury, obstruction of justice, and making a false
statement to federal investigators concerning the alleged illegal
disclosure.140 After this trial, the House Oversight and Government
Reform Committee began an investigation into the security leak and
ultimately subpoenaed documents from the Department of Justice
investigation, including transcripts of the interviews with the President
and Vice President.141 The Department of Justice resisted disclosure of
these transcripts and, ultimately, the President formally asserted a claim
of executive privilege over the relevant documents.142

135. See DOLAN & GARVEY, supra note 133, at 40.
136. See Comm. on Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 108 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that
former White House Counsel was not entitled to absolute immunity from testifying).
137. Id. at 98, 108.
138. DOLAN & GARVEY, supra note 133, at 41.
139. Id. at 42.
140. Id. at 41.
141. Id. at 42.
142. Id. at 42–43.
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Although the Committee scheduled a hearing on a potential
contempt of Congress citation, it was postponed and the Committee
did not pursue further action on the subpoena.143 This investigation
provides no support for congressional claims of authority to investigate
open criminal investigations.144 Although the Department of Justice did
provide some information relating to the investigation, this did not take
place until after the investigation and trial had been completed.145
Moreover, even with respect to the closed investigation, the
Department successfully resisted the Committee’s efforts to obtain the
President’s and Vice President’s interview transcripts.
3. Operation Fast and Furious
In 2011, whistleblowers within the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives (ATF), an agency within the Department of
Justice, claimed that an ATF initiative dubbed “Operation Fast and
Furious” had permitted straw purchases of firearms to be distributed to
drug cartel members in Mexico.146 In 2010, two of these guns were
found near a shootout that had resulted in the death of a U.S. border
patrol agent.147 In a March 2011 letter to the Department of Justice, the
House Oversight and Government Reform Committee requested all
documents and communications regarding Operation Fast and
Furious.148 In response to a subsequent Committee subpoena, the
Department of Justice produced numerous redacted files but refused
to disclose certain documents that “contain[ed] detailed information
about . . . investigative activities . . . including information that would
identify investigative subjects, sensitive techniques, anticipated actions,
and other details that would assist individuals in evading our law
enforcement effort.”149 Furthermore, the Department argued that other
documents were “withheld in order to protect pending criminal
investigations and prosecutions.”150
Upon receiving the above documents, the Committee subpoenaed
Attorney General Eric Holder to obtain the documents the

143. Id. at 44.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 45.
149. Id. at 45 (quoting Letter from Ass’t Att’y Gen. Ronald Weich to Chairman Darrell Issa
(June 14, 2011)).
150. Id. (quotations and internal citations omitted).
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Department did not produce.151 In response to a draft report for
committee consideration of a contempt of Congress citation, the
Department of Justice continued to withhold “core investigative
materials from . . . ongoing criminal investigations in order to protect
the independence and integrity of those efforts,” which reflected a
long-held “non-partisan commitment” to separation-of-powers
principles dating to the “early part of the 19th Century.”152 In particular,
the Department protested that disclosure would allow Congress to
“influence . . . the course of the investigation” or “seriously prejudice
law enforcement.”153 Eventually, after the Committee agreed to narrow
its subpoena, negotiations over disclosure collapsed, and President
Obama asserted a claim of executive privilege over the documents
because some documents “encompassed executive branch deliberative
communications” and others contained “information about ongoing
criminal investigations and prosecutions.”154
The House approved a formal contempt citation against Attorney
General Eric Holder for refusing to disclose the documents.155 In
response, the Deputy Attorney General informed the Speaker of the
House that the Department would not bring the congressional
contempt citation before a grand jury or take any other action to
prosecute the Attorney General.156 The House Committee filed a
lawsuit against the Department of Justice seeking to obtain civil
enforcement of the House subpoena.157 Almost four years later, the
District Court issued an opinion requiring disclosure of some of the
subpoenaed documents on the ground that the deliberative process
privilege asserted by the Department of Justice was unwarranted
because of the substantial disclosure of those documents in an
intervening report by the Inspector General of the Department of
Justice.158 For present purposes, the key point is that by the time the

151. Id.
152. Id. at 46 (quoting Letter from Dep. Att’y Gen. James M. Cole to Chairman Darrell Issa
(May 15, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/DAGLetter5-15-12.pdf.).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 47.
155. Id. at 48.
156. Id.
157. Complaint, Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, no. 1:12-CV-1332 (D.D.C.
Aug. 13, 2012).
158. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Lynch, 156 F. Supp. 3d 101, 114 (D.D.C. 2016)
(stating that the circumstances “serve to persuade the Court that whatever incremental harm that
could flow from providing the Committee with the records that have already been publicly
disclosed is outweighed by the unchallenged need for the material”). Under the Inspector

PETERSON FORMATTED 4.9 (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

FEDERAL PROSECUTORIAL INDEPENDENCE

4/17/2020 11:55 AM

255

opinion was issued, any pending investigations that might have been
affected by the documents had long since been closed or resolved.159
Thus, the ordered disclosures did not affect any pending or open
criminal investigation.
The litigation over the enforcement of the House Committee’s
subpoena dragged on for many years. The court’s first opinion dealt
with the President’s motion to dismiss on jurisdiction and justiciability
grounds.160 In particular, the court ruled that the political question
doctrine did not prevent the court from assuming jurisdiction over the
executive privilege dispute,161 the court had adequate subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to the federal question statute,162 the
congressional plaintiff had standing to bring the lawsuit,163 and the
court was not precluded from issuing a decision on the merits by the
D.C. Circuit’s doctrine of equitable discretion.164 Thereafter, both
parties moved for summary judgment: the House Committee on the
ground that the “Attorney General could not invoke executive
privilege to shield records that did not involve direct communications
with the President,”165 and the Department of Justice on the ground
that “the entire set of records was covered by the deliberative process
prong of the executive privilege.”166 The court denied both motions
without prejudice on the ground that “the executive branch could
properly invoke the deliberative process privilege in response to a
legislative demand, but that it could not do so unless the prerequisites
for the application of the privilege had been established.”167 The court
then ordered the Department to review each of the withheld
documents, produce all that were not both pre-decisional and
General Act of 1978, the Inspector General has to submit his or her reports to Congress. See Pub.
Law 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101, § 5(b).
159. The last person to be prosecuted in connection with the Fast and Furious scheme was
sentenced on December 12, 2012. See Fernanda Santos, Prison Term in Guns Case Tied to Agent’s
Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2012, at A25.
160. See Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2013)
(finding that there is “federal subject matter jurisdiction over this complaint, and it alleges a cause
of action that plaintiff has standing to bring”).
161. Id. at 10–11.
162. Id. at 17.
163. Id. at 21.
164. Id. at 24.
165. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, U.S. House of Representatives v. Lynch, 156 F.
Supp. 3d 101, 107 (D.D.C. 2016); Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, U.S. House of
Representatives v. Holder, Civil Action No. 12–1332 (ABJ), 2014 WL 12662665 (D.D.C. Aug. 20,
2014).
166. Lynch, 156 F. Supp. 3d at 107.
167. Id.
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deliberative, and create a specific index of all documents as to which
the Department continued to assert privilege.168
With respect to the documents withheld on the basis of the
deliberative process privilege, the court ruled that the Department’s list
was sufficiently detailed to suffice as a basis upon which to assert the
privilege.169 Moreover, the Court rejected the House Committee’s
contention that the deliberative process privilege applied only to
deliberations concerning the development of policy.170 In addition, the
Court stated it was “mindful of the principles that caution against
judicial intervention in a dispute between the other two branches, and
it recognizes that those principles derived from the balance of separate
powers carefully enunciated in the Constitution.”171 These principles
led the court to conclude that “in the unique situation presented here,
the court can decide this issue based on undisputed facts, without
intruding upon legislative or executive prerogatives and without
engaging in what would otherwise become a troubling assessment of
the relative merit and weight of the interests being asserted by either
party.”172 In the specific circumstances of this case, because the contents
of the documents as to which the Department asserted a deliberative
process privilege had already been substantially disclosed by a detailed
report of the Department’s Inspector General, the Department could
“point to no particular harm that would flow from compliance with this
subpoena, for these records, that it did not already bring about itself.”173
The Department withheld other documents, however, because they
contained “certain law enforcement sensitive material” and other
protected information.174 In particular, the court noted the Department
had requested that the Committee “refrain from contacting or
subpoenaing cooperating and other witnesses in indicted federal
criminal cases as part of its investigation of Operation Fast and Furious
while the criminal matters remain pending.”175 Although, as the court
remarked, “at oral argument, counsel for the Committee acknowledged
that these are privileges that are regularly respected in legislative
requests for information as a matter of comity,” the House argued that
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 108.
Id. at 108–10.
Id. at 110–12.
Id. at 113
Id.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 119 (citing Defendant’s Opposition to Motion to Compel at 27–28).
Id. at 120 (citing Letter from Ronald Weich to Darrell E. Issa (Apr. 19, 2012)).
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they did not “have sufficient trust in the Department of Justice to take
the Department’s word on [redactions]” made to exclude this type of
privileged material.176 The court rejected the Committee’s argument,
however, and ruled that it “has been provided with no reason to believe
that its assistance is needed to verify for counsel for one branch of
government assertions made by an officer of the court representing
another, equal branch of government.”177 As a result, the court denied
the Committee’s motion with respect to these documents relating to an
open criminal investigation and ordered the parties to negotiate about
the resolution of the Committee’s request for this material.178
Ultimately, the Department of Justice declined to appeal the
district court’s decision and turned over documents which they had
claimed the deliberative process privilege.179 The House Committee,
however, filed an appeal to obtain the remaining documents withheld
by the Department,180 and two years later the parties finally agreed to
a settlement that involved disclosure of other documents, although
none pertaining to any open criminal investigation.181 The settlement,
however, encountered a snag when District Judge Amy Berman
Jackson declined to vacate her two rulings, an action that both parties
had agreed upon as part of the settlement agreement.182 In May of 2019,
the parties finally informed the court of appeals that they had settled
the matter (although leaving each side some room to continue to
negotiate further details).183 Nothing in the case supports Congress’s
claim to access to material from an open criminal investigation.

176. Id. (citing Tr. of July 30, 2015 Hearing [Dkt. 109] at 49).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 120–21.
179. Josh Gerstein, Obama Relents in Fight Over Fast and Furious Documents, POLITICO
(Apr. 8, 2016, 4:59 PM), www.politico.com/story/2016/04/Obama-relents-in-fight-over-fast-andfurious-documents-221741.
180. Brief for Appellant, Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform of the U.S. House of
Representatives v. Barr, No. 16-5078 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 6, 2016), 2016 WL 5868690.
181. Todd Ruger, DOJ Agrees to Give Oversight Panel Fast and Furious Documents, ROLL
CALL (Mar. 7, 2018, 3:25 PM), https://www.rollcall.com/news/policies/DOJ-agrees-give-oversight
-panel-fast-furious-documents.
182. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, U.S. House of Representatives v. Sessions, 344
F. Supp. 3d 1, 15 (D.D.C. 2018).
183. Katelyn Polantz, Settlement in Fast and Furious Executive Privilege Lawsuit Between
DOJ and the House, CNN POLITICS, (May 8, 2019, 7:56 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/08/
politics/fast-and-furious-settlement-doj-house/index.html.
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4. Disclosure of Information Relating to the Mueller Investigation
of Russian Influence on the 2016 Election
In a profoundly perverse twist, the only significant disclosure of
material from open criminal investigation files to Congress came at the
behest of President Trump’s congressional supporters with the open
approval and support of President Trump. In July of 2017, aided by
several members of Congress, the Trump Administration began to go
on the offensive against Mueller and his team of investigators.184 House
Republicans obtained “some of the Government’s most sensitive
investigative files—including secret wire taps and the existence of an
FBI informant—that were part of the Russia inquiry.”185 President
Trump urged the members of Congress in private phone conversations
“to keep up the House Republicans’ oversight work.”186 Furthermore,
President Trump pressured administration officials, including Deputy
Attorney General Rod Rosenstein, to share sensitive materials from
the open Russian investigation with Congress.187 Devin Nunes, the
Chair of the House Intelligence Committee, threatened to hold the
Deputy Attorney General in contempt or impeach him if he did not
produce the investigative documents, including the file that was the
basis for commencing the Russia investigation.188 Members of Congress
unabashedly acknowledged that their investigative efforts had helped
the President’s defense.189
Former Department of Justice officials bemoaned these disclosures
as setting a terrible precedent for congressional access to open
investigations. Matthew Miller, the former Department of Justice
spokesperson under President Obama, stated: “This cave by DOJ will
have long-lasting ramifications. This is an area governed solely by
precedent, and DOJ is setting precedent that it is ok for Congress to
interfere with, and receive documents pertaining to, active
investigations.”190 Former U.S. Attorney and Deputy Assistant
Attorney General Harry Litman wrote in the Washington Post: “This
capitulation alters the balance of power between the Justice
Department and the Hill and makes it substantially more difficult for
184. Mazzetti, supra note 1.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Matthew Miller (@matthewamiller), TWITTER (Apr.
https://twitter.com/matthewamiller/status/987040540968521728.

19,

2018,

11:49

AM),
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department officials to resist future congressional interference in
active, politically charged investigations.”191
Given the circumstances of these disclosures, however, they should
hardly be given any precedential weight in future confrontations
between Congress and the Department of Justice. The earlier
conflicts192 were clear adversarial battles between the two branches in
which Congress sought criminal investigatory materials and the
Executive zealously sought to protect its constitutional prerogatives.
This was a case in which the President was openly pressuring the
Department to disclose the material because it was in his own selfinterest to discover information to aid in his defense of the Mueller
investigation. In essence, the President was colluding with the House
Committee to obtain backdoor discovery about the investigation. The
political alignment of the President and the House Committee
prompted the two branches to ignore their typical institutional roles.
Given the conflict of interest between the President’s desire for
information about his own case and the institutional interests of the
Department of Justice, this incident hardly represents a legitimate
precedent for future congressional investigative demands for records
from open criminal cases.
Indeed, because of the conflict of interest, the case presents a
perfect example of the potential harms of disclosures from open cases.
As former Senator Carl Levin wrote,
How dangerous is the assault by House Republicans on the special
counsel investigation by Robert Mueller? In terms of the operation
of our system of government, it is very dangerous indeed. There is
an ongoing investigation into Russian influence in the 2016 election.
While Donald Trump is apparently not a target, his campaign and
some of his top campaign officials are. This is a criminal
investigation in which President Trump has a deep and personal
interest.193

Given the circumstances, it is appropriate to recall the warning of
Attorney General Robert Jackson, who wrote:
Disclosure of the reports could not do otherwise than seriously
prejudice law enforcement. Counsel for a defendant or prospective

191. Harry Litman, Rod Rosenstein Has Made Two Critical Missteps, WASH. POST (Apr. 23,
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/rod-rosenstein-has-made-two-critical-missteps/
2018/04/23/4bd9c740-4689-11e8-9072-f6d4bc32f223_story.html?utm_term=.c77a1ed935f3.
192. See supra Parts III.C.1–3.
193. Levin, supra note 101.
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defendant, could have no greater help than to know how much or
how little information the government has, and what witnesses or
sources of information it can rely upon. This is exactly what these
reports are intended to contain.194

President Trump sought the material for precisely those reasons, and
thus became exhibit A for the case against disclosure of open criminal
investigative files.
5. The Conclusions that We May Draw from the Historical Record
The historical record makes it clear that Congress has conducted
oversight of the Department of Justice on many occasions. Most of
these investigations involved allegations of investigative or
prosecutorial misconduct by Department officials. Many of the
investigations did not require disclosure of pre-decisional deliberative
material from the Department’s criminal files. On a number of
occasions, however, Congress has obtained such deliberative material
from closed files, in spite of the Department’s reluctance to disclose
such records. In the face of a congressional subpoena, the Department
has withheld such material only if the material was protected by Rule
6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure195 or if the President
asserted a claim of executive privilege.
On the other hand, there is little precedent for Congress demanding
material contained in open criminal investigative files, and there are
even fewer examples of the Department of Justice actually producing
such documents. This precedent is particularly significant because so
many executive privilege disputes with Congress are resolved on the
basis of the perceived legitimacy of each branch’s claim based on past
practice. Based on the potential for improper congressional influence
over the decision to prosecute a particular individual, Congress should
not conduct oversight of open criminal investigations.
D. Conclusions about Prosecutorial Independence from the Legislative
Branch
The Constitution excludes Congress from any involvement in
prosecutorial decisions in individual cases even more forcefully than it
excludes the judiciary. Not only may Congress not give itself the power
194. Jackson, supra note 103.
195. The rule requires those who are part of the grand jury proceeding to “not disclose a
matter occurring before the grand jury,” including the grand jurors and the government attorney.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2).
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to appoint or control a prosecutor in ordinary cases, it may not do so
even in cases involving criminal contempt of Congress. Moreover, the
constitutional concern about the influence of congressional politics is
so significant that Congress is constitutionally barred from oversight of
open criminal investigations. These rules are not designed to protect
the President’s constitutional prerogatives; they are designed to protect
the three-step process of federal criminal prosecution from political
influence and unfairness to those who are subject to criminal
investigation and prosecution. The Constitution requires federal
prosecutorial independence from congressional interference in order
to protect individual liberty and preserve the integrity of the criminal
justice system.
IV. PROSECUTORIAL INDEPENDENCE WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH
Notwithstanding the President’s constitutional authority to manage
the executive branch, there are important norms that prevent the White
House from intervening in individual criminal cases. This section
explores those norms by first discussing the reasons for the norms and
the historic commitment to the separation of political influence from
prosecutorial decision-making. The section then recounts how this
decades-old principle suffered a serious blow during the Nixon
Administration, only to bounce back and be reinvigorated by a
succession of Attorneys General who were sensitive to the need for
integrity in the federal criminal justice system. The section concludes
with an analysis of the instances in which President Trump has
repeatedly violated those norms in ways that cast doubt on the integrity
of the criminal investigation process.
A. The Strong Policy Against White House Involvement in Individual
Prosecutions
The President has the power to “nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, appoint,”196 and remove at will all
of the top officials at the Department of Justice, including the Attorney
General, the Deputy Attorney General, the Associate Attorney
General, the Solicitor General, all the Assistant Attorneys General who
head the individual divisions within the Department of Justice, and the

196. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.

PETERSON FORMATTED 4.9 (DO NOT DELETE)

262

4/17/2020 11:55 AM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 15

United States Attorneys.197 This power does not mean, however, that
the President has the absolute right to intervene in decisions about
individual cases or investigations.198 There are important issues of
federal prosecutorial independence within the executive branch that
relate to laws or policies that insulate federal prosecutors from
influence by the president or others within the White House. As
President Obama wrote in the Harvard Law Review,
Even at the federal level, there are important limits on the
president’s authority . . . . Nowhere are these limits more important
than in the administration of the criminal law. For good reason,
particular criminal matters are not directed by the President
personally but are handled by career prosecutors and law
enforcement officials who are dedicated to serving the public and
promoting public safety. The President does not and should not
decide who or what to investigate or prosecute or when an
investigation or prosecution should happen.199

This insulation of federal prosecutors from political direction from the
White House in individual cases or investigations is founded on the
same principles that prevent congressional influence over specific
cases. Of course, the White House must be able to discuss general
prosecutorial policy and other matters of general Department
administration, but White House discussions with line prosecutors
delegitimize the prosecutorial process by raising the risk of politically
motivated decisions. For this reason, there have long been strict policies
regulating White House contact with the Department of Justice for at
least the last 80 years.200
197. See 28 U.S.C. § 541(b)–(c) (2018) (“Each United States Attorney is subject to removal
by the President.”); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696 n.34 (1988) (noting that U.S.
Attorneys are appointed by the president and “subject to termination at will”).
198. Contra Donald J. Trump, (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER, (Feb. 14, 2020, 8:33 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1228311415192215553 (remarking that, when it
comes to intervening in criminal cases, he has “the legal right to do so”); Kevin Liptak, Trump
Says He Didn’t Ask Justice Department to Change Stone Sentencing Recommendations, CNN
(Feb. 11, 2020, 5:33 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/11/politics/donald-trump-roger-stonejustice-department/index.html (President Trump declaring that he has “stay[ed] out of [criminal
cases] to a degree that people wouldn’t believe” but asserted that “I’d be able to do it if I wanted,
I have the absolute right to do it”).
199. Barack Obama, Commentary, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice
Reform, 130 HARV. L. REV. 811, 823 (2017) (footnotes omitted).
200. Scholars have debated the significance of the historical record prior to 1940. Several
scholars have argued that, in the early years of the republic, prosecutions of federal crimes were
largely independent of any centralized control. See Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the
Attorney General in Our Constitutional Scheme: In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 1989
DUKE L.J. 561, 585–86; Harold J. Krent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforcement:
Some Lessons From History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 286 (1989) (“From an early period, Congress

PETERSON FORMATTED 4.9 (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

FEDERAL PROSECUTORIAL INDEPENDENCE

4/17/2020 11:55 AM

263

These intra-branch issues deal with two different types of
prosecutorial independence. First, a specially appointed prosecutor
may be protected from removal in order to avoid a conflict of interest
when the prosecutor is investigating potential criminal wrongdoing by
the president or his close associates. Second, statutes or strong policy
norms may insulate federal prosecutors, including U.S. Attorneys, from
direct contact with the president or others in the White House to
protect against the appearance that investigations or prosecutions have
been initiated because of political influence.
Although the president is the sole head of the executive branch and
has the constitutional right to supervise subordinates within the
executive branch,201 there have traditionally been strong policy norms
forbidding White House involvement in the initiation of particular
criminal investigations or prosecutions. Attorney General Robert
Jackson identified “the most dangerous power of the prosecutor: that
he will pick people that he thinks he should get, rather than pick cases
that need to be prosecuted.”202 He noted:

limited the Executive’s effective control over criminal law enforcement ‘affirmatively’ by
dispersing supervisory responsibility among various executive officials.”). Others have disagreed.
For example, Presidents have not always abstained from involvement in individual investigations
or prosecutions. Professor Saikrishna Prakash has argued that “[h]istorical claims . . . about the
insulation of federal prosecution from presidential control are largely wrong.” Saikrishna
Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 526 (2005) (“Presidents Washington,
Adams, and Jefferson believed that they had constitutional authority to direct federal district
attorneys. In fact, each directed district attorneys to begin and cease prosecutions in . . . cases
suffused with foreign affairs implications, cases involving the domestic political opposition, and
even cases concerning the nation’s territorial integrity.”). Professor Prakash, cites, among
instances, President Washington’s decision to order prosecution of the participants in the
Whiskey Rebellion and President John Adams’s control over prosecutions against his political
enemies under the Sedition of Act of 1798. Id. at 555–65. Attorney General Roger B. Taney
authored a legal opinion in 1831 in which he concluded that a president had the power to direct a
federal district attorney to discontinue a civil forfeiture case. See Kate Andrias, The President’s
Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1050–54 (2013). Professors Green and Roiphe
conclude, with respect to the early history, “[t]he early history might suggest an intermediate
position. Although the early presidential involvement in criminal prosecution was justified as an
exercise of authority to ‘take care’ that federal laws are faithfully exercised, most of the reported
examples seem to implicate other presidential powers and, in particular, the power to conduct
foreign affairs. One might argue that, rather than possessing plenary authority over criminal
prosecutions, presidents could supersede ordinary prosecutorial independence only in cases
where enumerated presidential powers were implicated.” See Green & Roiphe, supra note 1, at
15; see id. at 38–69 (providing a thorough history of the 18th and 19th century history of
presidential involvement in prosecutions).
201. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926) (asserting that the President has the
power to “supervise and guide” his subordinates in “their construction of the statutes under which
they act”).
202. Robert H. Jackson, “The Federal Prosecutor” An Address by Robert H. Jackson,
Attorney General, Delivered at the Second Annual Conference of U.S. Attorneys, 1, 4 (Apr. 1, 1940,
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The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation
than any other person in America. His discretion is tremendous. He
can have citizens investigated and, if he is that kind of person, he
can have this done to the tune of public statements and veiled or
unveiled intimations. Or the prosecutor may choose a more subtle
course and simply have a citizen’s friends interviewed. The
prosecutor can order arrests, present cases to the grand jury in secret
session, and on the basis of this one-sided presentation of the facts,
can cause a citizen to be indicted and held for trial.203

The danger is that, if a prosecutor targets, or is told to target, a
particular person,
[i]t is not a question of discovering the commission of a crime and
then looking for the man who committed it, it is a question of
picking the man and then searching the law books, or putting
investigators to work to pin some offense on him. It is in this realm—
in which the prosecutor picks some person whom he dislikes or
desires to embarrass, or selects some group of unpopular persons
and then looks for an offense, that the greatest danger of abuse of
prosecuting power lies.204

Given this power, there is a unique danger in allowing the president
or his political operatives within the White House to press federal
prosecutors to investigate particular persons or groups. Unfortunately,
notwithstanding the general principle that politics should not influence
individual prosecutions, there have been times when the White House
has attempted to use federal prosecutor power for political ends. For
example, President Lyndon Johnson ordered the FBI to investigate and
report on civil rights groups and anti-Vietnam war groups for political
reasons.205 President Richard Nixon used the Department of Justice
even more aggressively to investigate political opponents, including
members of Congress and journalists.206 Both Attorney General John
Mitchell and his successor, Richard Kleindienst, allowed the
Department of Justice to be used for political purposes and as a tool to
advance presidential power.207
10:00 AM), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/09/16/04-01-1940.pdf.
203. Id. at 1.
204. Id. at 5.
205. See ATHAN THEOHARIS, THE FBI AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: A BRIEF CRITICAL
HISTORY 126–27 (2004).
206. STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE: THE LAST CRISIS OF RICHARD
NIXON 180, 233, 367 (1990); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 256–57
(1973).
207. NANCY V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE ATTORNEY’S
OFFICE, 1789–1990, 120–21 (1992).
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The Nixon White House not only utilized the Department of Justice
to threaten opponents, but it also intervened on numerous occasions to
halt or interfere with investigations of potential wrongdoing by the
White House. After resigning as President Nixon’s first Attorney
General, John Mitchell became the head of President Nixon’s reelection campaign.208 Mitchell approved the plans for illegal electronic
surveillance of the Democratic National Committee’s headquarters at
the Watergate Hotel as well as other illegal campaign activities
suggested by the White House and other campaign officials.209 After the
police arrested the operatives who attempted to break into the DNC
headquarters, the FBI opened an investigation under the federal
criminal statutes that banned unauthorized wiretaps.210 At that point,
John Ehrlichman, one of President Nixon’s chief White House aides,
called the FBI and told them, “I have a mandate from the President of
the United States . . . the FBI is to terminate the investigation of the
break-in.”211 When the FBI official who took Ehrlichman’s call refused
to close the investigation, Ehrlichman threatened to “doom the FBI
official’s career.”212 When that effort failed to halt the investigation,
President Nixon asked a senior CIA official to inform the FBI that
national security would be compromised if the FBI did not end the
investigation of the Watergate break-in.213
Throughout the FBI’s initial investigation of the Watergate breakin, the Department of Justice briefed the White House counsel on the
investigation and kept the White House informed of the results of the
investigation and the grand jury’s proceedings.214 Finally, and most
infamously, President Nixon ultimately ordered the Attorney General
to fire Archibald Cox, the special prosecutor in charge of the Watergate
investigation.215 Attorney General Elliott Richardson and Deputy
Attorney General William Ruckelshaus each resigned rather than

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. at 120–23.
Id. at 122–25.
Id. at 126.
TIM WEINER, ENEMIES: A HISTORY OF THE FBI 309 (2012).
Id. at 309–10.
Id. at 310–11.
KEITH W. OLSON, WATERGATE: THE PRESIDENTIAL SCANDAL THAT SHOOK
AMERICA 58 (2016).
215. Neil A. Lewis, Elliott Richardson Dies at 79; Stood Up to Nixon and Resigned in
“Saturday Night Massacre”, N.Y. TIMES (Jan 1, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/01/us/
elliot-richardson-dies-79-stood-up-nixon-resigned-saturday-night-massacre.html.
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comply with the President’s order to fire the special prosecutor.216
Ultimately, the firing of special prosecutor Archibald Cox generated so
much controversy that Acting Attorney General Robert Bork
appointed Leon Jaworski as the new Special Prosecutor to investigate
crimes related to the Watergate break-in.217
B. The Implementation and Evolution of Post-Nixon DOJ Policies to
Maintain Prosecutorial Independence
In the wake of President Nixon’s resignation, Congress enacted a
multitude of statutes to limit the ability of the White House to misuse
the Department of Justice. These statutes included the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act,218 the Ethics in Government Act,219 and
the Inspector General Act.220
Subsequent Attorneys General took actions that were equally
significant. For example, in 1976, Attorney General Edward Levi
adopted guidelines for FBI investigations in order to prevent the kinds
of abuses that had occurred during the Nixon years and the tenure of J.
Edgar Hoover as head of the FBI.221 Two years later, Attorney General
Griffin Bell adopted strict guidelines governing communications
between the White House and Department of Justice officials.222 He
acknowledged that “the partisan activities of some Attorneys General
in this century combined with the unfortunate legacy of Watergate,
have given rise to an understandable public concern that some
216. Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Forces Firing of Cox: Richardson, Ruckelshaus Quit, WASH.
POST (Oct. 1, 1973), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/watergate/
articles/102173-2.htm.
217. Kenneth B. Noble, Bork Irked by Emphasis on His Role in Watergate, N.Y. TIMES (July
2, 1987), https://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/02/us/bork-irked-by-emphasis-on-his-role-in-water
gate.html.
218. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-4511, 92 Stat. 1783 (providing
procedures the government needs to follow before surveilling American citizens and providing
congressional and judicial oversight over such surveillance).
219. Ethics and Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (requiring public
disclosure of financial information for public officials and setting the procedures that would
trigger the appointment of a special counsel).
220. Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101, codified as amended at
5 U.S.C. App. § 1 et. seq (creating Inspector General positions for various departments and
agencies, including the Department of Justice, that have the authority to review internal
documents and investigate, inter alia, fraud).
221. See John T. Eliff, Attorney General’s Guidelines for FBI Investigations, 69 CORNELL L.
REV. 785, 796–97, 798–99 (1984) (outlining the threshold requirements before opening up
domestic security investigations).
222. Griffin B. Bell., An Address by The Honorable Griffin B. Bell Attorney General of the
United States, (Sept. 6, 1978, 11:00 AM), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/
08/23/09-06-1978b.pdf.
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decisions at Justice may be the products of favor, or pressure, or
politics.”223
In order to remedy this concern, Attorney General Bell stated that
the primary responsibility for exercising prosecutorial discretion within
the Department had been assigned to the Assistant Attorneys General
in charge of each division.224 Of course, an Assistant Attorney General
would be permitted to consult with the Attorney General, the Deputy
Attorney General, or the Associate Attorney General, “but it is the
Assistant Attorney General’s responsibility to reach a decision in the
first instance.”225 In particular, because “Assistant Attorneys General
must be insulated from influences that should not affect decisions in
particular criminal or civil cases[,] . . . all communications about
particular cases, from members of Congress or their staffs, or members
of the White House staff, should be referred to my office, or the offices
of the Deputy or the Associate Attorney General. It will be our job to
screen these communications to ensure that any improper attempts to
influence a decision do not reach the Assistant Attorney General.”226
Attorney General Bell captured the essence of the potential problems
that could arise from contacts between the White House (or Congress)
with DOJ officials charged with prosecutorial decisions: “[T]he
problem is that their positions of power create a potential for
unintentional influence upon a decision, and they give rise to the
appearance of improper influence.”227
Attorney General Bell continued, “it is improper for any member
of Congress, any member of the White House staff, or anyone else, to
attempt to influence anyone in the Justice Department with respect to
a particular litigation decision, except by legal arguments or the
provision of relevant facts. This principle is essential to our proper
function, because litigation decisions are frequently discretionary.”228
Attorney General Bell concluded that, after the unfortunate events of
the Watergate era, the Department “may now be in the position to
establish firmly the tradition that the Attorney General and the lawyers
under him must be free from outside interference in reaching
professional judgments on legal matters. We must do everything that

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 6–7.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 9.
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we can, in our time, to help establish and reinforce such a tradition. I
firmly believe that the procedures and principles I have prescribed are
a long, important step toward that crucial goal.”229 Attorney General
Bell also stated, “the U.S. Attorneys are under these rules just as much
as anyone else.”230
Attorney General Bell’s remarks reflected a general consensus in
the post-Watergate era that prosecutorial decisions at the Department
of Justice should be insulated from both actual and apparent influence
from the White House and Congress.231 The President and officials in
the White House, however, must necessarily and properly
communicate with the Attorney General to establish enforcement
priorities and general Department of Justice policy.232 However, after
Watergate, scholars and politicians agreed that the Department of
Justice should never be used for partisan political purposes, personal
vendettas, or corrupt self-dealing, that the senior leaders of the
Department should play no role in electoral campaigns, and that the
Department should not engage in the collection of partisan political
information.233
Attorney General Bell’s Policy was reaffirmed by his successor,
Benjamin R. Civiletti, in a memorandum he issued to the heads of all
offices, boards, bureaus and divisions of the Department of Justice.234
Attorney General Civiletti stated that, as a general principle, the
officials with primary responsibility to initiate and supervise
prosecutions

229. Id. at 12–13.
230. Id. at 21.
231. See, e.g., PREVENTING IMPROPER INFLUENCE ON FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION’S SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 37–38 (1976) (arguing that “the Attorney General
should remain a loyal member of the Cabinet backed up by a highly competent and impartial core
of attorneys” and that the DOJ should be “divorced from partisan politics”).
232. For instance, Assistant Attorney General for the OLC, Robert G. Dixon, gave this
explanation justifying the necessary role the President plays in setting Department priorities:
The people of the country are properly concerned about matters such as organized
crime, civil rights, pornography, the death penalty, and enforcement of the antitrust
laws. These and other areas are legitimate issues of public interest in a presidential
campaign. The President should be able to set broad priorities in these and related
areas . . . .
Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Separation of the S. Comm. of the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. at 16. (1974).
233. Kent, supra note 1, at 1943.
234. Memorandum from Benjamin R. Civiletti to Heads of Offices, Boards, Bureaus and
Divisions (Oct. 18, 1979), www.justice.gov/ag/aghistory/Civiletti/1979/10-18-1979.pdf.
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must be insulated from influences that should not affect decisions
in particular criminal or civil cases. To ensure that this occurs, to
continue the independence of the Department of Justice, to prevent
even the appearance of conflicts of interest and to provide for the
most efficient and effective system of proper communications with
outside parties, we must provide for specific procedures to regulate
communication concerning pending cases.235

To implement this policy, Attorney General Civiletti directed that
any communications from the White House or Congress concerning a
pending case should be directed only to the offices of the Attorney
General, the Deputy Attorney General or the Associate Attorney
General.236 The memorandum also directed that any request for formal
legal advice or legal opinions should be directed to the Office of the
Attorney General or OLC.237 In addition, Civiletti limited the people in
the White House who could contact the Department of Justice to either
the head of the Domestic Policy Staff or the Counsel to the President.238
The policy also permitted the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs to raise matters relating to intelligence and national
security.239 Attorney General Civiletti concluded by stating: “We at
Justice are not infallible, but the responsibility for wielding our power
fairly is ours alone. Criticism after the fact is perfectly proper. Criticism
before the fact must be channeled so that fairness is not defeated, and
justice is served.”240
Although Attorney General Civiletti’s policy remained in effect
during the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations, it was
significantly relaxed during the George W. Bush administration. In
2007, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary noted in a report that, “by
adding the Offices of the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General,
President, Vice President, White House Counsel, National Security
Council, and Homeland Security, in their entireties, the new Bush
Administration policy241 permitted at least 417 people in the White
House to communicate with at least 42 people at the Department on
235. Id. at 1.
236. Id. at 1–2.
237. Id. at 2.
238. Id. at 2–3.
239. Id. at 3.
240. Id. at 4.
241. This policy, issued by Attorney General John Ashcroft, expanded the list of people in
various offices in the White House who may communicate with certain members of the
Department of Justice regarding matters including pending criminal investigations. S. Rep. No.
110-203, at 15–16 (Appendix B).
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non-National Security related matters.”242 The same Senate report
noted that in May of 2006, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales issued
a new policy that “permits at least 895 people in the Executive Branch
to communicate with at least 42 people at the Department on nonNational Security related matters.”243
Perhaps not coincidentally, during Attorney General Gonzalez’s
tenure the Department of Justice suffered the worst threat to
prosecutorial independence since Watergate. Attorney General
Gonzalez abruptly fired nine United States Attorneys at one time
because of alleged performance issues.244 As the DOJ Inspector
General later reported: “The way the Department handled the removal
of nine U.S. Attorneys in 2006, and the after-the-fact reasons proffered
for this, resulted in significant controversy, concerns that the removals
were undertaken for improper political purposes and allegations that
the reasons proffered by the Department for the removals were not
accurate.”245 After a lengthy investigation that resulted in a report of
well over 350 pages, the Inspector General concluded that its
investigation found significant evidence that political partisan
considerations were an important factor in the removal of several of
the U.S. Attorneys.246 In what the Inspector General characterized as
the “most troubling example,” the report found that the United States
Attorney for the District of New Mexico was removed because of
“complaints from New Mexico Republican politicians and party
activists about [the U.S. Attorney’s] handling of voter fraud and
corruption cases . . . and that the Department removed the U.S.
Attorney without any inquiry into his handling of the cases.”247 The
controversy over these firings led to a congressional investigation and
disputed claims of executive privilege, which then led to a congressional
lawsuit seeking production of White House documents and testimony
from two White House officials.248 The U.S. Attorney firings seriously
242. Id. at 2–3.
243. Id. at 3.
244. David M. Driesen, Firing U.S. Attorneys: An Essay, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 707, 710 & n.11
(2007); Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, “The U.S. Attorneys Scandal” and the Allocation of
Prosecutorial Power, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 187, 187–88 (2008).
245. U. S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE
REMOVAL OF NINE U.S. ATTORNEYS IN 2006 325 (2008).
246. Id. at 325–58 (analyzing the process used in terminating the nine U.S. Attorneys and
concluded, based on the findings of fact, that the reasons justifying their removal were “based on
improper political factors” and that “political partisan considerations were an important factor in
the removal of several of the U.S. Attorneys”).
247. Id. at 326.
248. See Comm. on Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 106–07 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that
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damaged the credibility of the Department and ultimately contributed
to the departure of Attorney General Gonzales.249
Michael Mukasey, the successor to Attorney General Gonzales,
issued a revised memorandum covering communications between the
White House and the Department of Justice.250 Attorney General
Mukasey’s memorandum argued that on “many subjects, the White
House and the Department must be able to communicate freely in
order to carry out efficiently the administration’s policies and
programs.”251 As a result, “all communications between the
Department and the White House that concern policy, legislation,
budgeting, political appointments, personnel matters related to
political appointees, public affairs, informal legal opinions,
intergovernmental relations, administrative matters, or similar matters
may be handled directly by the parties concerned.”252 The
memorandum cautioned that
[c]ommunications with respect to pending criminal or civilenforcement matters, however, must be limited. Therefore, the
Department will advise the White House about such criminal or
civil-enforcement matters only when it is important for the
President’s duties and where appropriate from a law enforcement
perspective. This limitation recognizes the President’s ability to
perform his obligation to “take care that the laws be faithfully
executed” while ensuring that there is public confidence that the
laws of the United States are administered and enforced in an
impartial manner.253

In order to implement this principle, the memorandum directed
that, on non-national security related matters regarding any specific
pending Department investigation or criminal or civil-enforcement
matter, “communications between the Department and the White
House should be limited to the Counsel to the President or Deputy
Counsel and the Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General.”254

former White House Counsel was not entitled to absolute immunity from testifying before
Congress).
249. See Steven Lee Myers and Philip Shenon, Embattled Attorney General Resigns, N.Y.
TIMES, August 27, 2007, at 1.
250. Memorandum from Attorney General Michael Mukasey for Heads of Department
Components and United States Attorneys (Dec. 19, 2007), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/ag/legacy/2008/04/15/ag-121907.pdf.
251. Id. at 1.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1–2.
254. Id. at 2.
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The Associate Attorney General could communicate regarding civilenforcement matters, and the Solicitor General could communicate on
matters relating to appeals.255
After the election of President Obama, Attorney General Eric
Holder issued a much more detailed memorandum governing
communications with the White House and Congress.256 That
memorandum stated that the
Assistant Attorneys General, the United States Attorneys, and the
heads of investigative agencies in the Department have the primary
responsibility to initiate and supervise investigations and cases.
These officials, like their superiors and their subordinates, must be
insulated from influences that should not affect decisions in
particular criminal or civil cases.257

Attorney General Holder cited the Supreme Court in determining that
those who exercise the Department’s investigatory and prosecutorial
powers are representatives “not of an ordinary party to a controversy,
but of a sovereign whose obligation to government impartiality is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but
that justice shall be done.”258
The memorandum required that initial communications between
the Department and the White House regarding pending or future
criminal investigations or cases would include only the Attorney
General or Deputy Attorney General and the Counsel to the President,
the principal Deputy Counsel to the President, the President, or the
Vice President.259 The memorandum permitted the Associate Attorney
General also to be involved with communications concerning a
pending or contemplated civil investigation or case.260 If continuing
contact between the Department of Justice and the White House would
be required, then the officials involved in the initial communication
could designate subordinates to carry on this contact, but those officials

255. Id.
256. Memorandum from Attorney General Eric Holder for Heads of Department
Components, All United States Attorneys, at 1 (May 11, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/oip/foialibrary/communications_with_the_white_house_and_congress_2009.pdf/download.
257. Id.
258. Id. (citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
259. Id. at 2.
260. Id. at 2.
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were required to keep their superiors regularly informed of such
contacts.261
With respect to congressional inquiries, the memorandum required
that any communications from individual senators or members of
Congress or their staffs should be directed only to the Attorney
General or Deputy Attorney General in the case of criminal
investigations and the Associate Attorney General in the case of civil
investigations or cases.262 Moreover, the memorandum also limited
communications with respect to personnel decisions regarding
positions in the civil service.263 In such matters, “communications
regarding positions in the career service are not proper when they
concern a job applicant’s or a job holder’s partisan affiliation. Efforts
to influence personnel decisions concerning career positions on
partisan grounds should be reported to the Deputy Attorney
General.”264
C. The Trump Administration’s Disregard of DOJ Precedent
One week after President Trump’s inauguration, his White House
Counsel, Donald F. McGahn, wrote a memorandum to all White House
staff concerning communications restrictions with personnel at the
Department of Justice.265 The memorandum stated that the DOJ
advises the White House about contemplated or pending investigations
or enforcement actions under specific guidelines issued by the
Attorney General and that “[a]s a general matter, only the President,
Vice President, Counsel to the President, and Deputy Counsel to the
President may be involved in such communications. These individuals
may designate subordinates to engage in ongoing contacts about a
particular matter with counterparts at DOJ similarly designated by
DOJ.”266 The memorandum further required that “[c]ommunications
with DOJ about individual cases or investigations should be routed
through the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Associate
Attorney General, or Solicitor General, unless the Counsel’s office

261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 3.
264. Id. at 3.
265. Memorandum from Donald F. McGahn II to All White House Staff, at 1 (Jan. 27, 2017),
https://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000015a-dde8-d23c-a7ff-dfef4d530000.
266. Id.
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approves different procedures for the specific case at issue.”267
Moreover,
[t]he President, the Vice President, Counsel to the President, and
Deputy Counsel to the President are the only White House officials
who may initiate a conversation with DOJ about a specific case or
investigation. These rules recognize the president’s constitutional
obligation to take care that the laws of the United States are
faithfully executed, while insuring maximum public confidence that
those laws are administered and applied impartially in individual
investigations or cases.268

Notwithstanding this apparent continuation of the policies set forth in
Attorney General Holder’s Memorandum, the Trump White House
quickly began to honor these restrictions in the breach.269
For example, the New York Times reported that White House
Counsel Donald McGahn “was working to secure access to what Mr.
McGahn believed to be an order issued by the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court authorizing some form of surveillance relating to
Mr. Trump and his associates.”270 Moreover, individuals in the White
House apparently asked the FBI to refute reports that Trump campaign
advisors had contact with Russia during the presidential campaign.271
In addition, the New York Daily News reported that White House
Senior Advisor Stephen Miller called the home of the U.S. Attorney for
the Eastern District of New York to give instructions on how he should
defend the Administration’s travel ban.272
Moreover, President Trump has violated the spirit of the policies
regarding White House contacts with the Department of Justice in the
numerous public statements in which he has called for the

267. Id.
268. Id. at 1–2.
269. See White House Communications with the DOJ and FBI, PROTECT DEMOCRACY (Mar.
8, 2017), https://protectdemocracy.org/agencycontacts/ (describing examples of the Trump
Administration’s breach of longstanding bipartisan policies limiting contacts between the White
House and the DOJ).
270. Michael D. Shear & Michael S. Schmidt, Trump, Offering No Evidence, Says Obama
Tapped His Phones, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/04/us/politics/
trump-obama-tap-phones.html.
271. Spencer Ackerman, White House Confirms Conversation with FBI About Trump and
Russia, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/24/
donald-trump-russia-reince-priebus-fbi-talks-james-comey.
272. Harry Siegel, Stephen Miller Called Brooklyn U.S. Attorney at Home and Told Them
How to Defend Travel Ban in Court, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 18, 2017), https://www.nydailynews.
com/opinion/stephen-miller-called-u-s-attorney-travel-ban-defense-article-1.2975873.
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investigation, indictment, or prosecution of various individuals.273
President Trump, in the face of criticism of his frequent
pronouncements, asserted, “I have the absolute right to do what I want
with the Justice Department.”274 As one scholar observed,
President Trump has made unorthodox private contacts with
Department officials with responsibility for criminal investigations
touching on his interests; publicly criticized senior department
officials for prosecutorial and investigative judgments; and accused
former officials including his predecessor, of politically motivated
surveillance and criminal conduct. All of these comments will be
heard by the FBI and others in the Department conducting
investigations touching on President Trump’s personal and political
interests. It exacerbates an already charged political climate that
presents challenges to the exercise of independent professional
judgment on the part of law enforcement and prosecutors.275

President Trump’s communications and comments have related
both to potential investigations of political opponents and to
investigations of himself and his political allies. In the first category, he
renewed his campaign demands for reopening the criminal
investigation of Hilary Clinton’s email use.276 President Trump also
demanded investigations of his opponent’s connections to a
controversial uranium deal and Democratic payments for the so-called
“Steele dossier” which included reports of Russian collusion with the
Trump campaign and other controversial allegations against President
Trump.277 He later wondered when the Department would “act” to
273. See Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, Trump Wanted to Order Justice Dept. to
Prosecute Comey and Clinton, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2018, 11:09 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/11/20/us/politics/president-trump-justice-department.html (describing how the President
urged, both privately and publicly, to investigate and prosecute former FBI director James Comey
for “mishandling sensitive government information and for his role in the Clinton email
investigation” and former Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton for grievances
propped up by right-wing media such as the “Uranium One deal”).
274. Michael S. Schmidt, Excerpts from Trump’s Interview with The Times, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/28/us/politics/trump-interview-excerpts.html.
275. Wright, supra note 1, at 360–61.
276. See Louis Nelson, Trump Ratchets Up Call for DOJ to Investigate Hilary Clinton,
POLITICO (Nov. 3, 2017, 7:56 AM), https://www.politico.com/stories/2017/11/03/trump-dojinvestigate-Hillary-Clinton-244505; see also Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER
(Dec. 2, 2017, 6:13 PM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/926404584456773632?lang
=en (“What About the Deleted [sic] e-mails, uranium, Podesta, the server, plus, plus . . .”);
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 3, 2017, 4:11 AM), https://twitter.com/
realdonaldtrump/status/926406490763784194?lang=en (“At some point the Justice Department,
and the FBI, must do what is right and proper.”).
277. In a series of four posts on Twitter, President Trump stated: “Never seen such
Republican ANGER AND UNITY as I have concerning the lack of investigation on Clinton
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prosecute Hillary Clinton’s former aide, Huma Abedin.278 The Mueller
Report found that President Trump “pushed back on the DOJ contacts
policy, and said words to the effect of, ‘You’re telling me that Bobby
and Jack didn’t talk about investigations? Or Obama didn’t tell Eric
Holder who to investigate?’”279 In addition, the Report found that the
President later called Attorney General Jeff Sessions at home and
“asked if Sessions would ‘unrecuse’ [sic] himself. According to Sessions,
the President asked him to reverse his recusal so that Sessions could
direct the Department of Justice to investigate and prosecute Hillary
Clinton . . . .”280 The President renewed his request that Sessions
investigate Hillary Clinton later in 2017.281 At that time, “the President
met privately with Sessions and said that the Department of Justice was
not investigating individuals and events that the President thought the
Department should be investigating.”282 According to notes taken at
the meeting, “the President mentioned Clinton’s emails and said,
“Don’t tell us, just take [a] look.”283
In the second category, communications and comments relating to
investigations involving President Trump or his associates, President
Trump has attempted to influence the course of those investigations
both publicly and privately. Publicly, the President frequently expressed
his ire over both Robert Mueller’s independent counsel investigation
of Russian interference with the 2016 presidential election and the
investigation by the United States Attorney for the Southern District
of New York into hush payments made by President Trump’s former
attorney, Michael Cohen, to women who had extramarital affairs with

made Fake Dossier (now $12 million).” Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct.
29, 2017, 6:53 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/924635359480303616?lang=en;
“[t]he uranium to Russia deal, the 33,000+ deleted emails, the Comey leaks and so much more.
Instead they look at phony Trump/Russia.” Id. (Oct. 29, 2017, 7:02 AM), https://twitter.com/
realdonaldtrump/status/924637600094326784?lang=en; “‘Collusion,’ which doesn’t exist. The
Dems are using this terrible (and bad for our country) witch hunt for evil politics, but the R’s.”
Id. (Oct. 29, 2017, 7:09 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/924639422066384896
?lang=en; “are now fighting back like never before. There is so much GUILT by
Democrats/Clinton, and now the facts are pouring out. DO SOMETHING!” Id. (Oct. 29, 2017,
7:17 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/924641278947622913?lang=en.
278. David Nakamura & Matt Zapotosky, Trump Urges Justice Department to “Act” on
Comey, Suggests Huma Abedin Should Face Jail Time, WASH. POST. (Jan. 2, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2018/01/02/trump-urges-justicedepart
ment-to-act-on-comey-suggests-huma-abedin-should-facejailtime/?utm_term=.1e477dbd ac2e.
279. Mueller Report, supra note 6, at Vol. II, 51.
280. Id. at 107.
281. Id. at 109.
282. Id.
283. Id.
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Donald Trump.284 For example, he made numerous public criticisms of
the Mueller investigation, which he repeatedly called a politically
motivated “witch hunt.”285 As CNN noted, President Trump “has used
the ‘Russia-hoax’ label at least once a month since March.”286
The President also acted outside of the public’s view. The New York
Times published an extensive review of President Trump’s efforts to
oppose and obstruct the various investigations of potential criminal
behavior in his administration.287 The Times noted that its investigation
revealed “the extent of an even more sustained, more secretive assault
by Mr. Trump on the machinery of federal law enforcement. Interviews
with dozens of current and former government officials and others
close to Mr. Trump, as well as a review of confidential White House
documents, reveal numerous unreported episodes in a two-year
drama.” As the Times further reported:
The story of Mr. Trump’s attempt to defang the investigations has
been voluminously covered in the news media, to such a degree that
many Americans have lost track of how unusual his behavior is. But
fusing the strands reveals an extraordinary story of a president who
has attacked the law enforcement apparatus of his own government
like no other president in history, and who has turned the effort into
an obsession.288

The Mueller Report confirmed the Times story and detailed
additional presidential efforts to restrict or terminate the Russia
investigation. The Mueller report cataloged these actions in over 140
pages of detailed factual findings, which will here be only briefly

284. See Linda Qiu, Truth-Testing Trump’s 250-plus Attacks on the Russia Inquiry, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/18/us/politics/fact-check-trump-russiaelection-interference-.html; Josh Gerstein et. al, Cohen Says He Paid Hush Money at Candidate
Trump’s Direction, POLITICO (Aug. 21, 2018, 2:50 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/08/21
/michael-cohen-strikes-plea-deal-with-prosecutors-790646 (describing President Trump’s
apparent role during the election in having Michael Cohen pay for the silence of two women who
allegedly had affairs with the President).
285. E.g., Noah Berman & Brian Bennett, Trump Lashes Out, Calls Russia Investigation a
“Witch Hunt”, L.A. TIMES (May 18, 2017, 2:45 PM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-poltrump-special-counsel-20170518-story.html.
286. Brian Stelter, Trump Says This is All a Hoax. Mueller, Congress and Facebook Disagree,
CNN (Sept. 22, 2017, 10:33 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/22/media/trump-facebookrussia/index.html.
287. See Mazzetti, supra note 1 (detailing the President’s attempts to end investigations that
could criminally implicate him by seeking to remove relevant personnel, discrediting the Mueller
investigation and its witnesses, and using his personal lawyer, Rudolph Giuliani, as a conduit of
information from the Mueller investigation).
288. Id.
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summarized.289 The Report notes that in January of 2017, the President
asked FBI Director James Comey to dinner at the White House and
that when Comey arrived, “he was surprised and concerned to see that
no one else had been invited.”290 During the dinner, the President made
comments that Comey interpreted to be “an effort to create a
patronage relationship by having Comey ask for his job.”291 Later, the
President stated to Comey, “I need loyalty, I expect loyalty.”292 A few
weeks later in February, the President cleared the Oval Office after a
meeting in order to speak privately with Director Comey.293 Once he
was alone with Comey, the President brought up the investigation of
then-National Security Director Michael Flynn. The President said to
Comey that Flynn “is a good guy and has been through a lot . . . I hope
you can see your way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn go. He is a
good guy. I hope you can let this go.”294 The Mueller Report notes that
Comey testified under oath that he took the President’s statement “‘as
a direction’ because of the President’s position and the circumstances
of the one-on-one meeting.”295
The Report also recounts President Trump’s efforts to get Director
Comey to “lift the cloud” created by the Russia investigation,296 by
which he meant that Comey should—in Comey’s words—“find a way
to get out that we weren’t investigating him.”297 When the President
called Comey to follow up on this conversation, Comey said that he
had passed the President’s request along to senior DOJ officials and
“he informed the President that the traditional channel for such a
request would be to have the White House Counsel contact DOJ
leadership.”298
The events leading up to the termination of FBI Director Comey
give further examples of the President’s efforts to influence the
investigation and the public’s perception of it. Before Comey’s
testimony at a Senate oversight hearing, the President “said it would be
the last straw if Comey did not take the opportunity to set the record
straight by publicly announcing that the President was not under
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

See Mueller Report, supra note 6, at Vol. II, 15–149.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 39–40.
Id. at 40.
Id.
Id. at 57–58.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 58–59.
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investigation.”299 After Comey declined to answer questions about the
Russia investigation, the “President became very upset and directed his
anger at [Attorney General] Sessions.”300 According to notes taken by
the Attorney General’s chief of staff, the President said: “This is terrible
Jeff. It’s all because you recused. AG is supposed to be most important
appointment. Kennedy appointed his brother. Obama appointed
Holder. I appointed you and you recused yourself. You left me on an
island. I can’t do anything.”301 By the next weekend, the President had
decided to fire Comey.302 The President wanted to include in the letter
firing Comey the fact that Comey had refused to state that the
President himself was not under investigation.303
After Comey’s dismissal, the White House asked the Department
of Justice to put out a statement that it was Deputy Attorney General
Rosenstein’s idea to fire Comey.304 Rosenstein declined to put out a
“false story” and told the President that it would not be a good idea for
Rosenstein to hold a press conference because he “would tell the truth
that Comey’s firing was not his idea.”305 Notwithstanding Rosenstein’s
comments, the White House press secretary told reporters, “[i]t was all
[Rosenstein]. No one from the White House. It was a DOJ decision.”306
The next day, in an Oval Office meeting with the Russian Foreign
Minister and the Russian Ambassador, the President said, “I just fired
the head of the F.B.I. He was crazy, a real nut job. I faced great pressure
because of Russia. That’s taken off . . . . I’m not under investigation.”307
After repeated false statements by the White House press office about
who initiated Comey’s termination, the President admitted in an
interview that he had already made up his mind to fire Comey and
continued: “And in fact, when I decided to just do it, I said to myself –
I said, you know this Russia thing with Trump and Russia is a made-up
story. It’s an excuse by the Democrats for having lost an election that
they should’ve won.”308
In discussing the facts relating to Comey’s firing, the Mueller
Report noted: “Substantial evidence indicates that the catalyst for the
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Id. at 62.
Id. at 63.
Id.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 70.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 73.
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President’s decision to fire Comey was Comey’s unwillingness to
publicly state that the President was not personally under investigation,
despite the President’s repeated requests that Comey make such an
announcement.”309 Moreover, the Report added, “[t]he President also
said he wanted to be able to tell his Attorney General ‘who to
investigate.’”310 The Report concluded: “The initial reliance on a
pretextual justification [for firing Comey] could support an inference
that the President had concerns about providing the real reason for the
firing, although the evidence does not resolve whether those concerns
were personal, political, or both.”311
The Mueller Report also details the President’s extensive efforts to
remove Mr. Mueller from his special counsel position.312 Among the
many facts cited by the Report are the following. After learning of the
appointment of the special counsel, the President became so upset that
he “slumped back in his chair and said, ‘Oh my God. This is terrible.
This is the end of my Presidency. I’m fucked.’”313 After expressing his
anger that Sessions had recused himself, he urged Attorney General
Sessions to resign. The Report states, “Sessions recalled that the
President said to him, ‘you were supposed to protect me,’ or words to
that effect.”314 The Report also recounts the President’s many efforts to
get Mueller removed on various conflict-of-interest grounds.315
Eventually, the President told the White House Counsel to have
Mueller removed from office.316 The Counsel, however, did not follow
the President’s instructions, even after receiving a follow-up call from
the President with a second request to have Mueller fired.317 The
Report concludes: “Substantial evidence indicates that the President’s
attempts to remove the Special Counsel were linked to the Special
Counsel’s oversight of investigations that involved the President’s
conduct – and, most immediately, to reports that the President was
being investigated for potential obstruction of justice.”318
After failing to have Mueller removed from office, the President
made considerable efforts to curtail the Special Counsel
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

Id. at 75.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 77–87.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 80–84.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 86.
Id. at 89.
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investigation.319 First, the President asked his former campaign
manager, Corey Lewandowski, to deliver a message to Attorney
General Sessions to limit the investigation to future election
interference.320 Lewandowski, however, never delivered the message.
The President later told Lewandowski “that if Sessions did not meet
with him, Lewandowski should tell Sessions he was fired,” but again,
the meeting never took place.321 Other efforts to limit the investigation
included public criticism of Attorney General Sessions for not
controlling the investigation322 and ordering his Chief of Staff to
demand Session’s resignation.323 The Mueller Report concluded that
“substantial evidence indicates that the President’s effort to have
Sessions limit the scope of the Special Counsel’s investigation to future
election interference was intended to prevent further investigative
scrutiny of the President’s and his campaign’s conduct.”324
In sum, the efforts by the President and his legal team to interfere
with and discredit the investigations of his potential criminal activity
make President Nixon’s efforts to derail the Watergate investigation
look like small potatoes in comparison. The Mueller report put the
President’s acts together this way:
Our investigation found multiple acts by the President that were
capable of exerting undue influence over law enforcement
investigations, including the Russia-interference and obstruction
investigations. The incidents were often carried out through one-onone meetings in which the President sought to use his official power
outside of usual channels. These actions ranged from efforts to
remove the Special Counsel and to reverse the effect of the
Attorney General’s recusal; to the attempted use of official power
to limit the scope of the investigation; to direct and indirect contacts
with witnesses with the potential to influence their testimony.
Viewing the acts collectively can help to illuminate their
significance. For example, the President’s direction to McGahn to
have the Special Counsel removed was followed almost
immediately by his direction to Lewandowski to tell the Attorney
General to limit the scope of the Russia investigation to prospective
election-interference only – a temporal connection that suggests

319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

Id. at 90.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 92–93.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 97.
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that both acts were taken with a related purpose with respect to the
investigation.325

The President’s efforts to influence individual cases before the
Department of Justice did not cease with the conclusion of the Mueller
investigation. For example, the President became publicly involved in
the case of his friend and confidant, Roger Stone, who was convicted in
November of 2019 of obstructing an inquiry by the House Intelligence
Committee into Russian interference in the 2016 election, lying to
federal investigators, and attempting to prevent the testimony of a
witness who could disclose his false testimony.326 After President Trump
complained on Twitter that the prosecutors’ recommended sentence of
seven to nine years in prison was “horrible and very unfair” and went
on to say that he “[c]annot allow this miscarriage of justice,” Attorney
General William Barr intervened in the case and changed the
recommendation to a more lenient sentence.327 After the Attorney
General’s action, three of the four prosecutors who investigated and
prosecuted the case withdrew from the case, and a fourth resigned from
the Department altogether.328 The prosecutors’ anger was amplified by
the fact that they were told of the reversal only after Fox News reported
it.329
The action created a firestorm of protest as department lawyers and
former federal prosecutors spoke out against the reversal of the
prosecutors’ recommendation.330 One former prosecutor stated, “in
essence, the leadership of the Justice Department has commandeered
the sentencing in a politically sensitive criminal matter, reversing the
position uniformly accepted and promoted by the career
prosecutors.”331 The New York Times reported:
Prosecutors across the United States, who spoke on the condition of
anonymity to avoid reprisals, said this week that they had already
been wary of working on any case that might catch Mr. Trump’s
attention and that the Stone episode only deepened their concern.

325. Id. at 157.
326. See Katie Benner, Sharon LaFraniere, & Adam Goldman, Prosecutors Quit Roger Stone
Case After Justice Dept. Intervenes on Sentencing, N.Y. TIMES, February 11, 2020, at 1.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. See Katie Benner, Sharon LaFraniere, and Adam Goldman, After Stone Case,
Prosecutors Say They Fear Pressure From Trump, N.Y. TIMES, February 12, 2020, at 1.
331. Id.
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They also said that they were worried that Mr. Barr might not
support them in politically charged cases.332

In spite of the Justice Department’s denials that any official had
conferred with President Trump about the case, many remained
skeptical about the legitimacy of the process. Jack Goldsmith, who
headed the Office of Legal Counsel under George W. Bush,
commented: “Even assuming that Bill Barr is acting with integrity, it is
impossible to believe that because the president is making him look
like his political lap dog. Trump makes it impossible to have confidence
in the department’s judgment.”333
Given the evidence contained in the Mueller Report and the
President’s interference in the Stone investigation, there is little doubt
that the traditional independence of federal prosecutors is facing one
of its most significant challenges. The current White House has ignored
the previously well-entrenched limitations designed to prevent politics
from influencing criminal investigations and cases. Although, at this
point, there is not any definitive evidence that the President’s efforts
have affected any particular investigations or prosecutions, there is
ample reason to consider how one might reinforce these important
protections against misuse of the federal criminal enforcement regime.
V. POSSIBLE WAYS TO REINFORCE FEDERAL PROSECUTORIAL
INDEPENDENCE
This final section considers ways to think about how Congress or
future administrations might respond to the challenges to federal
prosecutorial independence. The first response is conceptual. We can
reinforce the norm of independent prosecutorial decision making by
placing it in the context of the separation-of-powers principles that
mandate prosecutorial independence from the judicial and legislative
branches and then looking for ways to reinforce this norm. The second
response involves potential statutory or regulatory changes that would
protect prosecutorial independence in individual cases while respecting
the President’s constitutional power to direct the general policies and
management of the Department of Justice.

332. Id.
333. Id. Even the Attorney General himself subsequently complained that President Trump’s
comments on individual cases like Stone’s “make it impossible for me to do my job.” Katie
Benner, Barr Says Attacks From Trump Make Work ‘Impossible’, N.Y. TIMES, February 13, 2020,
at 1.
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A. Conceptualizing Federal Prosecutorial Independence as Part of the
Constitutionally Mandated Separation of Powers
By looking at the subject of federal prosecutorial independence
from the perspective of all three branches, it is much easier to
understand why there must be exceptionally strong separation-ofpowers policy limitations on White House involvement in individual
cases and investigations. The strict limitations on judicial and legislative
involvement in individual cases are not designed just to protect
presidential prerogative; they are required in order to protect the
integrity of the constitutional mandate that all three branches
participate independently in the federal criminal process. The judicial
branch may conduct the trials in individual cases, but it may not create
or recognize common law crimes, nor may it require the executive to
bring or try a particular case. The legislative branch may pass laws of
general applicability, but it may take no part in directing or even
influencing the selection of those who will be prosecuted, nor may it
participate in the adjudicative process that determines individual guilt
or innocence. The executive is left with the task of investigating possible
crimes and bringing individuals to trial.
For the executive’s separate role in individual prosecutions to be
meaningful, however, it must be carried out in a manner that is free
from political influence or even the appearance of political influence.334
Just as Congress must carry out its constitutional oversight role without
allowing it to influence open criminal investigations, the executive
branch must carry out its prosecutorial role without White House
involvement in individual cases. Each branch must prevent politics
from tainting the investigative and prosecutorial process. If they
weaken their commitment to this principle, individual liberty is
jeopardized and the Constitution’s careful design is damaged. This is
not merely a question of good policy; it addresses the issue of abusive
use of presidential power in a way that threatens individual liberty and
presidential accountability. The constitutional prohibitions on judicial
and congressional interference explain why politically based influence
in individual criminal prosecutions is an abuse of presidential
prerogative.

334. The constitutional policies that underlie the restrictions on the legislature and the
judiciary necessarily imply a norm that restricts political interference from the White House. The
policy is not a matter of constitutional law, but is rather a governing principle that derives from
the structure and principles of the Constitution.
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The first way to reinforce this principle is for the Senate Judiciary
Committee to demand that every Senate-confirmed nominee for
positions in the Department of Justice agree to adhere to the principles
most recently set forth in the Holder memorandum.335 For example,
after the U.S. Attorney crisis forced the resignation of Attorney
General Alberto Gonzales, the Senate used the confirmation hearings
for his successor, Michael Mukasey, to repeatedly question the nominee
about the Justice Department’s White House Contacts policy and
obtain a commitment to issuing detailed procedures to restrict contacts
between the White House and the Department of Justice lawyers.336
After his confirmation, Attorney General Mukasey fulfilled his
commitment and issued a new memorandum restricting contacts
between the White House and Department of Justice lawyers.337
This should not be an ad hoc process but should become a standard
that both parties agree, in advance of any nomination, to apply to
nominees of both parties.338 These commitments could be monitored by
vigorous oversight of any potential violations of the policy and
enforced by censure votes or even, in the appropriate case, possible
impeachment.339 The Government Accountability Office and the
Department of Justice Inspector General could be given roles in
monitoring compliance with the White House contacts policy.340 If the
Judiciary Committee has the will and the institutional sense of purpose
to enforce this policy, the public would be much more aware of its
importance and would care about enforcement of the policy, which
would make breaches of the policy much less likely.
B. Possible Statutory and Regulatory Changes
If the commitments of nominees prove to be an insufficient barrier
to improper White House interference, Congress might consider
statutory changes, including mandates that the Department adopt
formal regulations to implement a White House contacts policy.341 It
seems clear that it would not be constitutionally impermissible for
335. See supra text accompanying notes 256–64; see also Kent, supra note 1, at 1955–57.
336. See Nomination of Michael B. Mukasey to be Attorney General of the United States:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong., at 99–100 (2007) (questions of
Chairman Patrick J. Leahy); id. at 147–49 (questions of Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse).
337. See supra text accompanying notes 250–55.
338. If necessary, in order to avoid partisan motives, both parties could set a confirmation
standard on this issue that would not be implemented until after the next presidential election.
339. Kent, supra note 1, at 1957–60.
340. Id. at 1960–61.
341. Id. at 1962–64.
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Congress to significantly regulate White House involvement in
individual prosecutions. As Peter Shane has recently argued, given the
weak link between the Framers’ conception of core executive power
and the federal prosecutorial function, there is little constitutional
reason to limit Congress’s ability to regulate the relationship between
the White House and federal prosecutors.342 Indeed, as Shane points
out,
Criminal prosecution, like environmental protection or food safety
regulation, is an administrative function for which the executive
branch would have no role except insofar as Congress grants such a
role though its statutory enactments. Indeed the peripheral status of
the prosecutor in relation to the core of executive power is
especially clear precisely because, at the time of the Founding,
prosecution would have been understood to have as much of a
judicial as it does an executive character. Against the actual
historical background of prosecution, it is entirely faithful to
original understanding to respect Congress’s authority to determine
the scope of presidential policy control over criminal prosecutors.343

One additional change would be easy to implement. Congress could
require the DOJ and White House to file a regular report of any
contacts that were outside the scope of the White House contacts policy
with the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. In 2007, the Senate
considered a bill titled “Security from Political Interference in Justice
Act of 2007.”344 The bill, S. 1845, came out of a Senate hearing involving
the testimony of Attorney General Alberto Gonzales concerning the
greatly expanded number of White House and Department of Justice
officials who were permitted to discuss open investigations and cases.345
The bill would have required both the Department of Justice and the
White House to submit semiannual reports to the Senate and House
Committees on the Judiciary listing all “covered communications”
between the White House and the Department of Justice, with certain
exceptions.346 Covered communications were defined as “any
communications relating to an on-going investigation conducted by the
Department of Justice in any civil or criminal matter (regardless of
whether a civil action or criminal indictment or information has been

342.
(2019).
343.
344.
345.
346.

Peter Shane, Prosecutors at the Periphery, 94 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 241, 241–45
Id. at 264.
Security from Political Interference in Justice Act of 2007, S. 1845, 110th Cong. (2007).
S. Rep. No. 110-203, at 3–6, 17–19 (2007).
Id. § (3).
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filed).”347 They did not include “any communication relating to policy,
appointments, legislation, rule-making, budgets, public relations,
programmatic matters, intergovernmental relations, administrative or
personnel matters, appellate litigation, or requests for legal advice.”348
For the communications that originated from the Department of
Justice, the bill exempted the communications of the Attorney General,
the Deputy Attorney General, and the Associate Attorney General
from being reported.349 For communications that originated from
White House, the bill exempted the communications of the President,
the Vice President, the Counsel to the President and the Counselor to
the President.350 The Senate report noted, “one of the most common
and effective tools of congressional oversight is to require the
Executive Branch to produce reports to Congress.”351 Although the
Judiciary Committee favorably reported the bill by a vote of 14 yeas
and 2 nays, the full Senate took no further action on the bill.352 Congress
should now resume consideration and pass such a bill.
Beyond this kind of measure, Congress should tread very carefully
lest they fall victim to the overregulation that followed the resignation
of President Nixon. Given the egregious conduct described in the
Mueller Report, Congress might be very tempted to impose sweeping
limitations on the President’s authority or to resurrect some of the nowdiscarded statutory reforms of the post-Watergate era. These measures
lapsed or were repealed for good reason. In the long run, they created
more problems than they solved.
For example, it would be a mistake to resurrect the wisely discarded
independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act. The
hair-trigger appointments of independent counsels under the old
statute generated overlong investigations of mostly insignificant
subjects. The few investigations that were worthy of independent
investigation could (and would) have been easily handled by a special
counsel appointed by the Department of Justice like Leon Jaworski and
Robert Mueller. Even if a renewed statute were still deemed

347. Id. § (2)(1)(A).
348. Id. § (2)(1)(B).
349. Id. § (2)(2)
350. Id. § (2)(3).
351. S. Rep. No. 110-203, at 7 (2007).
352. Id. at 8. The House released its own version of the bill. See Security from Political
Interference in Justice Act of 2007, H.R. 3848, 110th Cong. (2007).
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constitutional,353 it would be unwise and probably not necessary to
solve the problem of improper White House contacts.354
There is even more reason to reject proposals that were not adopted
after Watergate. For example, legislation to make the Department of
Justice more independent by imposing limitations on the President’s
power to remove senior Department of Justice officials are
constitutionally suspect and unnecessary.355 Those proposals did not
succeed even during the hyper-regulatory phase of the post-Nixon era,
and they should not be resurrected now.356 The Department of Justice
is a resilient organization with lawyers who are committed to the
impartial enforcement of the law. Without diminishing the gross
impropriety of the conduct documented by the Mueller Report, it is
worth noting that there has been no evidence that the Department
altered the investigation or prosecution of individual cases in response
to the attempted interference by the White House. Part of the reason
that the more radical proposals for Department of Justice
independence have not succeeded (in addition to the significant
constitutional problems associated with making the entire Department
of Justice an independent agency) is the significant decentralization of
the Department of Justice, which makes routine interference in
prosecutorial decision-making quite difficult.357 That decentralization
353. In recent years, some scholars have been sympathetic to Justice Scalia’s dissent in
Morrison. See, e.g., Counsels and the Separation of Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 115th Cong. 5 (2017) (statement of Akhil Reed Amar asserting that “[t]he lion’s share
of the constitutional law scholars who are most expert and most surefooted on this particular topic
now believe that Morrison was wrongly decided and/or that the case is no longer ‘good law’ that
can be relied upon as a sturdy guidepost to what the current Court would and should do”). Other
scholars pointedly disagree and continue to regard Morrison as good law. See, e.g., Shane, supra
note 342. The fact remains that, whatever individual Justices may have said before being
confirmed, the Supreme Court itself has not given any indication that it would reexamine
Morrison or that the Court’s decision in Morrison is not good law.
354. Even before the Independent Counsel Act expired, some critics argued that it would be
preferable to assign prosecutions of federal officials to career prosecutors because, functionally,
they are least likely to act in a partisan fashion. See, e.g., Julie O’Sullivan, The Independent
Counsel Statute: Bad Law, Bad Policy, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 463, 475 (1996) (“DOJ prosecutors,
who have a necessarily broader focus and are privy to a store of institutional knowledge and
experience, are better positioned to exercise their discretion in a professional and equitable
manner, and are accountable if they do not.”).
355. See Kent, supra note 1, at 1980–96 (proposing that the structure of the FBI be changed
in order for its director to only be removed for cause).
356. See supra notes 218–20.
357. See Leslie B. Arffa, Separation of Prosecutors, 128 YALE L.J. 1078, 1115–18 (2019);
Green and Zacharias, supra note 244, at 196–200 (describing the organizational structure of the
DOJ as “some mix of centralization and grant of discretion to lower-level attorneys” and noting
that the DOJ is so large and complex that, as a practical matter, the Attorney General is limited
in his ability to influence the work of the U.S. Attorneys).
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operates as a significant intra-branch check on regular and consistent
instances of unwelcome political influence.358
CONCLUSION
The separation of powers operates nowhere more clearly than in
the distribution of powers over federal criminal prosecution. Each
branch has a clearly defined role to play, and each branch is limited in
the extent to which it participates in the determination of individual
guilt or innocence. Congress may pass laws of general applicability. The
executive may identify and prosecute those who violate those laws. The
courts may determine individual guilt or innocence. Congress’s role in
creating criminal law is consistent with its political character. The
Constitution requires electoral accountability for the creation of our
laws. That is why, in the federal system, the mainly unaccountable courts
have no role in the creation of the criminal laws. On the other hand, we
want the courts that determine individual guilt or innocence to operate
independently so that the application of the criminal law is not tainted
by political influence. The executive’s role involves both general and
individual decision-making. With respect to general prosecutorial
policy, it is appropriate for the politically accountable White House to
direct the actions of the Department of Justice. With respect to
individual cases, however, the involvement of the White House is just
as suspect as the involvement of Congress. It is up to Congress to make
certain that this important intra-branch separation-of-powers norm is
respected at the Department of Justice.

358. Arffa, supra note 357, at 1115.

